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AI, on the Law of the Elephant:
Toward Understanding Artificial
Intelligence 1
EMILE LOZA DE SILES†
“Reality is one, though wise ones speak of it variously.”
Rigveda, 1500–1200 B.C.E. 2

1. Back when the internet was nascent, Judge Easterbrook asserted that
there was no need for or wisdom in the specific development of internet law. In
short, he said that we might as well create a “law of the horse” for all the sense
that would make. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996). That horse proving too provocative to
resist, Professor Lawrence Lessig wrote a presciently insightful response. See
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501 (1999). Professor Lessig’s views went on to carry the day, and their
conversation inspired countless others, including this author.
2. Rigveda (1500–1200 B.C.E.), quoted in PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, AN APOLOGY
APOLOGETICS: A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 46 (1991);
see Rigveda, Hindu Literature, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic
/Rigveda (Mar. 12, 2020).

FOR

†Emile Loza de Siles is Visiting Assistant Professor at Howard University School
of Law and Assistant Professor at Duquesne University School of Law. She
founded Technology Law Group in 2003 and has provided technology and
intellectual property legal services to Cisco, HP, Accenture, and other innovators.
She is also Associate Professor (adjunct) of the University of Maryland Global
Campus’s graduate cybersecurity program. Professor Loza de Siles has been
nominated to serve on the inaugural National Artificial Intelligence Advisory
Committee and on its Subcommittee on Artificial Intelligence and Law
Enforcement. See Call for Nominations To Serve on the National Artificial
Intelligence Advisory Committee and Call for Nominations To Serve on the
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ABSTRACT
Machine learning and other artificial intelligence (AI)
systems are changing our world in profound, exponentially
rapid, and likely irreversible ways. 3 Although AI may be
harnessed for great good, 4 it is capable of and is doing great
harm at scale to people, communities, societies, and
democratic institutions. 5 The dearth of AI governance leaves
unchecked AI’s potentially existential risks. 6 Whether
Subcommittee on Artificial Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 86 Fed. Reg.
50326-01 (Sept. 8, 2021). She chairs the Section on Minority Groups of the
Association of American Law Schools. She is a member of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and serves on its Artificial
Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Policy Committee, P2863 Working Group
on the Organizational Governance of Artificial Intelligence, and other AI working
groups. Professor Loza de Siles holds a technology undergraduate degree, an
MBA, a JD from The George Washington University, and cybersecurity strategy
management graduate certificate from Georgetown, with a data science graduate
certificate underway with Harvard.
Thanks to Steven Bender, Miguel Bordo, Sherley Cruz, César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Eric Goldman, Verónica Gonzales-Zamora, Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Jan Levine, Amy Lovell, Gary Marchant, Katherine Norton,
Christine Pollack, Julia Tedjeske, and Kristy White. Special thanks to Don
Simon, Shivam Rai, and Chetan Ganjihal for their technical reviews; my research
assistants Danielle Mrjanovich, Kate Dumais, and Daniel Matesic; and the
members of the Buffalo Law Review. Gratitude always to my family. Animo!
Contact: lozae@duq.edu.
3. See Artificial Intelligence for Europe, at 1, COM (2018) 237 final (Apr. 25,
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(20
18)237&lang=en.
4. See, e.g., AI for Good Global Summit, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION,
https://aiforgood.itu.int/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2021).
5. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age
of Artificial Intelligence, 72 FLA. L. REV. 331, 343–61 (2020) (addressing AI’s
tremendous benefits and emerging problems, such as harmful algorithmic
biases).
6. See Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging
Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 385, 414–27 (2017) (pointing to regulatory deficiencies as AI
technology rapidly advances). Few laws or regulations specifically address AI,
although state and local authorities have begun to lead the way. See, e.g., City
and County of S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 103-19 (May 21, 2019), https://sfbos.org/
sites/default/files/o0103-19.pdf; N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 49 (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437
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sounding urgent alarm or merely jumping on the bandwagon,
law scholars, law students, and lawyers at bar are
contributing volumes of AI policy and legislative proposals,
commentaries, doctrinal theories, and calls to corporate and
international organizations for ethical AI leadership. 7
Unfortunately, erroneous, incomplete, and overly simplistic
treatments of AI technology undermine the utility of a
significant portion of that literature. Moreover, many of those
treatments are piecemeal, and those gaps produce barriers to
the proper legal understanding of AI.
Profound concerns exist about AI and the actual and
potential crises of societal, democratic, and individual harm
that it causes or may cause in future. On the whole, the legal
community is not currently equal to the task of addressing
those concerns, lacking sufficient AI knowledge and
technological competence, despite ethical mandates for
diligence and competence. 8 As a result, law and policy debates
and subsequent actions may be fundamentally flawed or
produce devastating unintended consequences because they
relied upon erroneous, uninformed, or misconceived
understandings of AI technologies, inputs, and processes.
Like the elephant in the ancient Jain parable, the wise ones
may conceive of only a fraction of the AI creature and some
more or less blindly. 9
Now more than ever, lawyers need to be able to see around
critically important corners. The general lack of
understanding about AI technology robs the legal profession
A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0.
7. See, e.g., Guihot et al., supra note 6, at 436–37; see also Emilie C.
Schwartz, Note, Human vs. Machine: A Framework of Responsibilities and Duties
of Transnational Corporations for Respecting Human Rights in the Use of
Artificial Intelligence, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 232 (2019) (noting AI’s harmful
implications for international human rights).
8. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
9. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207 (“Beliefs lawyers hold about
computers, and predictions they make about new technology, are highly likely to
be false. This should make us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for
cyberspace. The blind are not good trailblazers.”).
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of that foresight. This state of affairs also raises significant
ethical concerns. Worse, it undermines lawyers’ power,
authority, and legitimacy to bring forward truly valid,
meaningful ideas and solutions to prevent AI from becoming
humanity’s apex predator. 10
This Article responds with several descriptive and
theoretical contributions. As to its descriptive contributions,
it aims to correct and augment the record about AI,
particularly machine learning and its underlying
technologies and processes. It endeavors to present a concisely
and accessibly stated foundational, but sufficiently
comprehensive, single-source explanation. The Article draws
extensively from the scientific and technical literatures and
undertakes an important interdisciplinary 11 translational
process by which to map the AI technical lexicon 12 to legal
terms of art and constructions in patent and other cases. 13
Because their understanding is foundational, the Article
drills down on three principal AI inputs: data, including data
curation; statistical models; and algorithms. It then engages
in illustrative issue-spotting within these AI factual frames,
sketching out some of the many legal implications associated
with those vital understandings.
Toward its theoretical contributions, the Article presents
two conceptual sortings of AI and introduces a systems- and
process-engineering-inspired taxonomy of AI. First, it
categorizes AI by the degree of human involvement in and,
conversely, the degree of AI autonomy in AI-mediated
decision-making. Second, it conceptualizes AI as being static
or dynamic. Those distinctions are vital to AI’s potential for
10. See the esoteric mind of mi marido for this terrifying vision of AI; see also
WAR OF THE WORLDS (Paramount Pictures and DreamWorks Pictures 2005).
11. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
12. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 415 (2012) (“[O]ne of the chief functions of our
courts is to act as an animated and authoritative dictionary.”).
13. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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harm, meaningful accountability, and, ultimately, the proper
prioritization of AI governance efforts. Third, the Article
briefly introduces a taxonomy that conceptualizes AI as a
human-machine enterprise made up of series of processes. By
perceiving “the whole of the AI elephant,” the role of human
decision-making and its limits may be understood, and the
human-machine enterprise that is AI and its constituent
processes may be deconstructed, comprehended, and framed
for subsequent scholarship, doctrinal and procedural
analyses, and law and policy developments. With these, the
Article hopes to help inform and empower lawyers to improve
the security, justness, and well-being of people in the
increasingly algorithmic world.
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INTRODUCTION
On an ancient day, a nomadic traveler, riding on the back
of an elephant, arrived in a remote village. The massive and
remarkable creature was an absolute mystery, something
never before beheld by the village folk. Fearful and confused,
they ran to the village leader. “Go,” he commanded, “bring
our old ones. They will tell us what it is.” Presently, a group
of wizened and blind villagers approached, led by the excited
sighted who placed them before the beast and implored them
to explain. The old blind women and men reached out their
hands and thus encountered different parts of the animal.
One of these found the fearsome point and heavy curve of a
tusk, crying out, “Why, this is an enormous plow!” One,
touching the writhing trunk, drew back and exclaimed, “It is
a giant snake! Watch out lest it bite you!” Another felt one of
the elephant’s big flapping ears, calling out, “No, it is a great
fan!” Yet another old one exclaimed, “Of course! It is a
mahogany tree!”, wrapping her arms around a massive leg.
“No, it is a sturdy wall!,” another old one claimed, feeling his
way down the elephant’s mountainous sides. “You’re all
wrong!” the last cried, “It is a rope,” gripping the creature’s
thick cable of tufted tail. In the midst of growing confusion
and dissension, the nomad approached. “Why, good people!
The reality is but one, although your wise ones speak of it
variously. This reality is an elephant!” 14
14. GRIFFITHS, supra note 2, at 46 (quoting Rigveda (1500–1200 B.C.E.)); see
Rigveda, Hindu Literature, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic
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This is the Jain parable of andha-gaja-nyāya. 15 For the
law and lawyers today, it is a metaphor for understanding
the domain of artificial intelligence.
Anekāntavāda is the Jain doctrine of the multiplexity or
many-sidedness of reality. 16 Under the doctrine of
anekāntavāda, reality, in addition to being many-sided, is in
a constant and inevitable state of change. 17 The Jain parable
of the blind ones and the elephant illustrates that reality in
its infinite nature is perceived and understood based upon
differing predications, which, in turn, give rise to necessarily
partial views. 18 Where such partial views are
unconditionally accepted, each view holder is weddedly blind
to reality’s other properties, those properties sitting outside
the scope of that view. The proper comprehension of reality
in its complexity requires a method of study and logical
analyses that incorporates all viewpoints. 19 Without this, a
“superficial, deficient cognition” results by which view
holders grasp at partial or scant data and underdeveloped
notions. 20 The law can go seriously wrong when emanating
from such cognition.
In the language of physics, reality under anekāntavāda
reflects a high state of entropy, that is, a high degree of
unpredictability and disorder. 21 Anekāntavāda and high
/Rigveda (Mar. 12, 2020).
15. Transliterated from Sanskrit, andha-gaya-nyāya means “the maxim of
the blind people and the elephant.” Piotr Balcerowicz, Some Remarks on the Naya
Method, in ESSAYS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 37, 40 (Piotr Balcerowicz
ed., 1st Indian ed. 2003). I contribute my own version of this parable.
16. See id. at 37; Anekāntavāda, Jainism, BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/topic/anekantavada (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
17. See Balcerowicz, supra note 15, at 37.
18. See id. at 39–40.
19. See id. at 40–41.
20. Id.
21. See Gordon W.F. Drake, Entropy, BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/science/entropy-physics (last visited June 2, 2021). Entropy is
likewise a measure of disorder and, in machine learning, of a particular random
variable’s uncertainty. See MOHSSEN MOHAMMED, MUHAMMAD BADRUDDIN KHAN
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entropy well describe the current state of law, legal practice
at bar and bench, and legal scholarship and education
regarding artificial intelligence and related technologies
(collectively, AI).
In the many-sided, constantly changing reality of AI, the
law is struggling. The technologies and their implications are
complex and rapidly evolving. Compounding that
complexity, too few lawyers understand AI and how it works
or, at a more foundational level, its terminology. The terrible
consequence is that lawyers’ lack of sufficient AI knowledge
and competency places people, communities, institutions,
civil society, and even the rule of law itself at grave and
perpetual risk through continued exposure to rapidly
scaling, but virtually ungoverned AI. 22
A lack of effort by legal scholars and other legal writers
is not the cause of this lack of AI knowledge and competency.
The legal literature is replete and burgeoning with articles
mentioning AI and related topics. 23 Indeed, the legal
literature around AI exploded at least five years before the
topic came to any arguably meaningful Congressional
attention in 2018. 24 It is urgent that the AI legal scholarship
& EIHAB BASHIER MOHAMMED BASHIER, MACHINE LEARNING: ALGORITHMS
APPLICATIONS 38 (2017).

AND

22. But see Daniel L. Chen, Machine Learning and the Rule of Law, in LAW AS
DATA: COMPILATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 429, 433–41
(Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019) (arguing machine
learning used to detect judicial bias, arbitrariness and variability may enhance
rule of law and improve judicial education and decision-making).
23. For example, in 2019, there were 2,107 law review and bar journal articles
about AI. Westlaw Queries, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html
(searches using following criteria: “algo!,” “artificial intelligence,” “big data,” and
“machine learning”) (on file with author). By contrast, in 2013, 814 such articles
appeared. Id. In 2017, there were 1,881 such articles, 1,475, or some 78% of
which, appeared in law review journals. Id.
24. See Comparative Analysis of Artificial Intelligence Search Results (Jan.
1, 2020) (based upon Westlaw Searches of Law Review and Journal Articles,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html (searches using following criteria:
“artificial intelligence,” “machine learning,” “algorithm!,” and “big data”) and of
Federal Congressional Record, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record
(searches using following criteria: “artificial intelligence,” “‘machine learning’ of
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should direct great energy toward rationalizing AI within
legal constructs and to contribute guidance for those who
will, and must, govern AI-mediated societies. Nothing short
of the future of the rule of law and of humankind is at stake.
Contemporary explanations of AI in the legal literature,
however, are often superficial 25 and, in some instances, even
erroneous. Coverage of the technological foundations of AI
phenomena is a patchwork with legal scholarly writings
tending to focus on small pieces of the elephant as bases for
the legal theories or policies therein proposed. Adopting a
narrower and caveated scope of view is a common and
important scholarship practice, but one that, here, confounds
what law needs: a sufficiently detailed, comprehensive, and
carefully expressed understanding of AI and related
technologies.
Absent that, readers of narrow and partial legal
treatments of AI may ignore the finer nuances of and
carefully constructed caveats applicable to AI and,
consequently, may arrive at faulty cognitive understandings
about AI. 26 This, in turn, undermines the logical bases and
appropriate application of the AI law and policy constructs
‘neural network!’ or ‘deep learning’ or ‘reinforcement learning’,” “algorithm!,” and
“‘big data’ or ‘data /2 broker!’ or ‘aggregate!’ or ‘miner’ or ‘mining’ or ‘appender!’”))
(on file with author). The latter search criteria were expanded in comparison to
the former to produce more numerous results from the Congressional Record.
Analyses of the Congressional Record results showed spiking instances of the
appearance of the search terms starting in 2018. In the year with the highest
number of results, and the latest examined year, however, there were still only
215 appearances of any of the search terms in the Congressional Record. Id. The
yearly Congressional Record appearances totaled 34, 43, 54, 50, 53, 98, and 215
for 2013 through 2019, respectively. Id. The yearly law review and journal
appearances totaled 430, 526, 513, 654, 901, 1,170, 1,291, 1,673, 2,273, and 2,837
for 2010 through 2019, respectively. Id.
25. This observation holds even when accounting for the necessary brevity of
bar journal articles, which constituted about one quarter of the literature in a
sample year.
26. “It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. Insensibly one
begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.” SIR ARTHUR
CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 5 (1892) (The Adventures
of a Scandal in Bohemia).
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proposed in the writings. Worse yet, inferences,
subsequently discovered to have been erroneously drawn,
may be lain later at the feet of legal scholars and unjustly
call into question the validity of their arguments and
recommendations. The continued lack of a comprehensively
laid out understanding of AI in the legal literature as support
for other AI legal scholarship is deeply problematic.
Forsooth, how does the elephant run—walk—survive with
only three legs? Poorly, if at all.
In contrast, with such a companion and support as this
Article aspires to be, clearer and more cohesive lines of
inquiry can emerge within the AI legal scholarship. By doing
so, the needs to repetitively explain the current technological
underpinnings of AI and to expend valuable publication “real
estate” diminish. This frees legal scholars to focus with even
greater depth and intensity upon the theoretical and
procedural questions at hand. The Article also hopes to
expand the field of inquiry for legal scholars by offering a
scaffolding upon which to build and consider more finely
drawn legal implications of, for example, uses of
convolutional neural networks and imputed data for
international economic development, human rights, and
sustainability 27 or recurrent neural networks used in
medical imaging contexts. 28 The impact of legal scholarship
to inform thinking, public policy, lawmaking, judicial and
regulatory decision-making, and, in sum, the “long game”
about AI and what it means for justice and law 29 will
increase as readers better adopt and elaborate upon those
27. See, e.g., Carla Gomes et al., Computational Sustainability: Computing
for a Better World and a Sustainable Future, 62 COMMC’NS ACM, Sept. 2019, at
56, 57–58, https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3339399.
28. See generally Robert DiPietro & Gregory D. Hager, Deep Learning: RNNs
and LSTM, in HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL IMAGE COMPUTING AND COMPUTER ASSISTED
INTERVENTION 503 (S. Kevin Zhou et al. eds., 2020).
29. Robin West & Danielle Citron, On Legal Scholarship, ASS’N OF AM. L.
SCHS. 14 (Aug. 2014), https://www.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08
/OnLegalScholarship-West-Citron.pdf. See generally DiPietro & Hager, supra
note 28.
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teachings because they are built upon a strong foundational
understanding of AI. They will no longer be those wise, but
blind persons trying to comprehend the whole of the elephant
by grasping whatever part of the gargantuan creature is at
hand. 30 It will take time, however, to flesh out the beast.
Toward that, this Article offers the following
contributions. First, it reads the language of AI technologies,
inputs, and processes into the legal literature through an
interdisciplinary translational map by which to relate the AI
technical lexicon to legal terms of art and constructions in
patent and other cases. Second, it sketches some exemplary
legal
implications
associated
with
those
vital
understandings. Third, it offers an engineering and lawdriven taxonomy for conceptualizing the whole of the AI
elephant as a process to be deconstructed and analyzed.
Because their understanding is fundamental to subsequent
learnings and work regarding AI, the Article then drills
down to analyze three principal inputs for artificial
intelligence within that taxonomic model: data, statistical
models, and algorithms.
I.

THE PROBLEM SPACE

The AI problem space for lawyers consists of three
interlinking problems. First, the most fundamental basis for
comprehending AI is the language of its technical arts. The
AI lexicon is confounding. Second, the constituent
components of AI are equally confounding, each having its
own deep complexity. Add to those further complexities in
the diversity of AI applications, delivery models, and
markets, for example. Automation bias, the use of
abstraction as an analytic tool before AI has been unpacked
from its black boxes, and other perspectives and analytical
30. See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POEMS
JOHN GODFREY SAXE 259, 259–61 (1873); see also David M. Zlotnick, The
Buddha’s Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 958–61 &
nn.5–9 (2001).
OF
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practices also create barriers. Third, the ethical rules that
govern all attorneys unequivocally require competency,
including technological competency in general and AI
competency in particular, and the diligence by which to gain
and maintain that competency. Absent independent
enforcement of these duties by governments or private
litigation, however, competency compliance remains a
matter of self-enforcement, which seems a gravely
inadequate approach in the face of all that AI portends for
law and justice.
This Section discusses each of these three interlinking
problems in turn and then closes with a summary of some of
the AI dangers that threaten lives, communities, and civil
society if those problems are not addressed soon.
A. Crossing the Lexicon: Lost in the Translation
When Julius Caesar dared to cross the Rubicon, he broke
the lex cornelia majestatis, committing treason and
embarking on an irrevocable course of action that sparked
revolution, civil war, and, ultimately, his triumphant
ascendency as the Roman emperor. 31
The unknown likewise confronts those who wish to cross
into and read the AI lexicon. Terms of foreign arts lie ahead,
terms that are highly technical, esoteric, and seemingly
abstruse in the extreme. When the reading starts discussing
feature vectors, 32 the strengths and weaknesses of various
statistical models, and zero-shot learning, 33 it can be
31. See David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
477, 494 n.56 (2008); Emily Rodriguez et al., Rubicon, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Rubicon (last visited Dec. 8, 2021); Arnold
Joseph Toynbee, Julius Caesar, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/biography/Julius-Caesar-Roman-ruler (last visited Dec. 8, 2021); Ernesto
Valgiglio, Sulla, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sulla
#ref141208 (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
32. See, e.g., ANDRIY BURKOV, THE HUNDRED-PAGE MACHINE LEARNING BOOK
1–4, 9–10 (2019) (ebook), http://themlbook.com/.
33. See, e.g., id. at 95–96.
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intimidating. Add in mathematical notation and formulae,
programming syntax, and model diagrams, and it can get
downright fearsome. 34
Furthermore, the terms of art from cognitive science,
statistics, computer science, and other AI-involved
disciplines do not necessarily map to terms of art in law. 35
Some words may be so deeply ingrained and veneered in the
legal arts that technical terms of art may be immediately
imbued with legal connotations. Such “automated thinking”
may engender error and blind readers to the term’s proper
understanding within the AI context. 36
Bias is one such term: essential on one side, anathema
on the other. For example, inductive bias, or “bias,” is “the
set of all factors that influence hypothesis selection,” 37 and
that bias is essential to the proper functioning of AI and,
specifically, to machine learning. 38 Briefly, under a
supervised machine learning model, the AI system is exposed

34. See, e.g., JONAS PETERS, DOMINIK JANZING & BERNHARD SCHÖLKOPF,
ELEMENTS OF CAUSAL INFERENCE: FOUNDATIONS AND LEARNING ALGORITHMS 66, 85
(2017).
35. See, e.g., State v. Torgerson, 611 N.W.2d 182, 184 (N.D. 2000) (random
selection under Federal Jury Selection and Service Act); United States v. Rioux,
97 F.3d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1996) (statistical decision theory applied to jury
selection).
36. JUDITH S. HURWITZ, MARCIA KAUFMAN & ADRIAN BOWLES, COGNITIVE
COMPUTING AND BIG DATA ANALYTICS 13 (2015); see id. at 13–14.
37. PAUL E. UTGOFF, MACHINE LEARNING OF INDUCTIVE BIAS 5 (1986). The
views on biases in machine learning have developed greatly since 1980 when bias,
as a core theoretical concept, was introduced. See Thomas Hellström, Virginia
Dignum & Suna Bencsch, Bias in Machine Learning - What Is It Good For?,
ARXIV 2 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.00686.pdf (citing TOM M.
MITCHELL, THE NEED FOR BIASES IN LEARNING GENERALIZATIONS, RUTGERS UNIV.
COMP. SCI. DEP’T, TECH. REP. NO. CBM-TR-117, at 1 (1980) (referring to “bias” as
“any basis for choosing one generalization over another, other than strict
consistency with the observed training instances” (emphasis omitted))). Today,
there are many types of bias in machine learning, some useful and some
problematic. See generally id. This exemplary discussion considers inductive bias,
now a cornerstone of statistical learning theory. See id.
38. See UTGOFF, supra note 37, at 5–29.
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to training sets. 39 From those exposures, the system is to
learn its statistical modeling by correlating combinations of
input data and meaningful parameters, or features, within
such data sets to yield computational results that reflect the
so-called “target concept,” such as the concept that criminal
offenders present some comparatively higher risk of
recidivism. 40
Another way to express this is that the machine learner,
once in operation post-training, carries out inductive
computational processes by which meaningful attributes,
i.e., features, within the data are analyzed, and the degree to
which those features fit the target concept is hypothesized. 41
Thus, the machine formulates various hypotheses and uses
bias to sort through them, iteratively seeking to optimize its
selection of the best hypothesis from among the available
candidates, the best one being assumed to reflect the target
concept. 42 It is essential 43 to supply the activation points at
which the learning system’s decision-making fires to decide
39. See id. at 5.
40. Id. at 3; see also id. at 5; Memoona Khanum et al., A Survey on
Unsupervised Machine Learning Algorithms for Automation, Classification and
Maintenance, 119 INT’L J. COMPUT. APPLICATIONS 34, 34 (2015); Donald Firesmith,
Multicore Processing, SOFTWARE ENG’G INST.: SEI BLOG (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2017/08/multicore-processing.html.
41. See STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 785–87 (3d ed. 2010); UTGOFF, supra note 37, at 3–6.
42. See UTGOFF, supra note 37, at 5.
43. See id.
A program that learns concepts from examples is successful only when
it has a bias that guides it to make a satisfactory selection from among the
available hypotheses. Without the bias, the program has no basis for
rejecting one hypothesis in favor of another. If the concept learner
[referring to the machine learning system] is to make choices on a nonrandom basis, then bias is necessary.
Id. (emphases supplied and citation omitted); see also JIAWEI HAN, MICHELENE
KAMBER & JIAN PEI, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES § 9.2.3, at 403–04
(3d ed. 2012) (discussing updating of biases and weights in machine learning);
PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 78–79 (2015) (analyzing
differences and interrelationships between bias and variance).
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“yes” or “no” when iteratively comparing one hypothesis with
another and choosing between them toward the best
hypothesis. Bias is what informs those points of decision. 44
In simplest technological terms, bias equals good. For
machine learning, bias is more than good. It is essential.
For the computational minds of the law, bias has
precisely the opposite character. The ideals toward which
law strives are fairness, justice, and equality. 45 Bias is
antithetical to those concepts. Its meaning and connotations
are closely tied to racism, sexism, other forms of illegal
discrimination, and other illegitimate bases for decisionmaking. 46 For law, bias equals bad. 47 At scale and as
systematized, iteratively propagated, and perpetuated in the
form of discrimination arising from the design, use, and
misuse of AI systems, bias is not merely bad. 48 Unchecked, it
44. See, e.g., MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note 21, at 90–93 (discussing optimal
weights and bias for AI system’s decisional activation).
45. But see Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To:
The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016).
46. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Jon M. Garon, AI and the Labor Laws, in THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND SMART MACHINES: UNDERSTANDING A.I. AND THE LEGAL IMPACT
75, 81–83, 87 (Theodore F. Claypoole ed., 2019); Nizan Geslevic Packin & Yifat
Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 88, 95–113 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo
Pagallo eds., 2018); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 186–87 (rev. ed. 2012); Anjanette
H. Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, Building a
Better HAL 9000: Algorithmics, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the
Engraining of Bias, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 233 (2018).
48. See, e.g., AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS: CHALLENGING
GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 13 (2018) [hereinafter AI
NOW LITIGATING ALGORITHMS], https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms
.pdf (discussing successful challenge to “long-standing” use of violence risk
assessment system in juvenile criminal matters by District of Columbia courts
and many “significant concerns about embedded racial bias” therein). See also,
among key case documents discussed in AI NOW LITIGATING ALGORITHMS, supra,
at 13, and on file with the author, Motion to Exclude Results of the Violence Risk
Assessment and all Related Testimony and/or Allocution Under FRE 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, In re T.K. (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2018)
[hereinafter SAVRY Motion] (challenging use of Structured Assessment of
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is catastrophic. 49
The journey in this Article starts with the AI lexicon, to
be crossed like Hannibal on war elephants and on to triumph
in Rome. 50
B. Abstraction and Other Obfuscations
The challenges of the AI lexicon, the first AI problem, are
compounded by the use of abstraction. Abstraction has been
an indispensable analytic and explanatory tool for law since
time immemorial. 51 Abstraction enables collections of details
to be organized and distilled into principles, theories, and
factors. 52 Thus, the contours of what suffices as control over
ferae naturae can be distilled from parsing the facts of
various circumstances presented over time, as the court did
in the classic property case of Pierson v. Post. 53 Further,
courts choose and apply different levels of abstraction to
decide what are and are not fundamental rights under the
Violence Risk in Youth, or SAVRY, violence risk predictive system against
juvenile defendant).
49. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3 (2016); Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2014) (discussing need to test creditscoring systems for human bias).
50. See William Culican, Hannibal: Carthaginian General [247-c.181 BC],
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hannibal-Carthaginiangeneral-247–183-BC (last visited Nov. 17, 2021). To Jan and Alejandro, forgive
me. I know. Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and I have mixed historical metaphors.
51. See Abstraction Definition, SIMPLYPHILOSOPHY, https://simplyphilosophy
.org/study/abstraction-definition/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2021); Brent Cooper, How
to Humanize AI with Abstraction, MEDIUM (July 26, 2017), https://medium.com
/the-abs-tract-organization/how-to-humanize-ai-with-abstractionbd379036e67a.
52. Abstraction is also an organizing approach within AI and information
technology more broadly. See HURWITZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 251. For example,
in cloud computing, the computing infrastructure is abstracted away from the
user in an infrastructure-as-a-service, or IaaS, model. See id.
53. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Angela
Fernandez, Fuzzy Rules and Clear Enough Standards: The Uses and Abuses of
Pierson v. Post, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 97, 99–108 (2013).

1406

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Constitution, for example. 54
The problem with applying abstraction to AI law and
policy analyses is that, in most instances, it is premature to
do so. The facts, specifically the relevant facts, must always
come first. At least two analytical steps must occur prior to
an exercise in abstraction. First, the facts must be laid out.
Second, the facts must be winnowed to separate out only
those facts relevant to the legal questions at hand. As
cautioned by Judge Easterbrook in the context of
constitutional rights, the abstracted principles underlying
those rights are, or should be, the products—not the
progenitors—of the relevant facts, those being the
constitutional text and its history. 55
This is a chicken and elephant problem. These days,
scholars grapple mightily to abstract legal principles to apply
to AI and to construct coherent doctrinal theories and
governance rules for it. A thorough understanding of AI’s
technological bases and interrelated workings is necessary to
better sequence the analyses for more completely informed
abstractions. A clearer perception of those interrelations
then allows issues to emerge and thus implicate the requisite
law. The elephant must always come first.
It is also important to avoid mystifying AI and to be
aware of automation bias and other human weaknesses as
they may obfuscate the points at which abstraction should be
applied. 56 Automation bias is the use of and reliance upon
automation to replace one’s own processes of discovery,
54. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
349, 359–71 (1992).
55. See id. at 362–63.
56. See John D. Lee & Katrina A. See, Trust in Automation: Designing for
Appropriate Reliance, 46 HUM. FACTORS 50, 51 (2004) (“[M]isuse and disuse of
automation may depend on certain feelings and attitudes of users, such as trust.
This is particularly important as automation becomes more complex . . . .”); see
also, e.g., William E. Foster & Andrew L. Lawson, When to Praise the Machine:
The Promise and Perils of Automated Transactional Drafting, 69 S.C. L. REV. 597,
598 (2018) (“[R]eliance on software creates risks of undue deference to computergenerated outputs . . . .”).
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research, and analysis. 57 The current difficulty, if not near
impossibility, of assessing AI’s functions, accuracy, and
validity tends to drive the analytical treatment of AI into the
category of a “credence good,” one that is “consume[d] on
faith.” 58 This may lead to viewing and accepting AI systems
as impenetrable black boxes, 59 which, along with other
challenges outlined herein, may short-circuit the depth and
precision of factual inquiries necessary to properly enable
abstraction approaches to AI. 60
Artificial intelligence is a human institution 61 and, like
other human institutions, must be appropriately understood,
employed, and controlled, but never accepted with
unquestioning deference. Although AI systems may be used
for great and abundant good, 62 they are not “infallible
57. See Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1262, 1271 (2008); Heuristic, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 2014) (Entry B2).
58. Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS.
L.J. 55, 80 (2018).
59. STEPHEN LUCCI & DANNY KOPEC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 6 (2d ed. 2016); see also Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not
Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 51 (2019)
(warning against reductive “black box” treatment of human decisional values,
control, and contributions). But see generally Cooper, supra note 51.
60. See Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments,
Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364, 394–99
(2019); Vera Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret
Algorithms Used in Criminal Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915, 923–25 (2018).
61. Accord O BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU? (Universal 2000) (Sheriff Cooley,
responding to protagonists’ protests to their extrajudicial lynching after being
granted pardon, states: “The law? The law is a human institution.”).
62. See, e.g., AI for Good Global Summit, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION,
https://aiforgood.itu.int/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2021); Michael A. Livermore,
Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted Regulatory
Participation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1007–23 (2018). See generally, e.g.,
Marta Poblet & Jonathan Kolieb, Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the
Digital Era: New Tools, Old Challenges, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 259 (2018); Lois R.
Lupica, Tobias A. Franklin & Sage M. Friedman, The Apps for Justice Project:
Employing Design Thinking to Narrow the Access to Justice Gap, 44 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1363 (2017); SWEETIE 2.0: USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO FIGHT
WEBCAM CHILD SEX TOURISM (Simone Van der Hof et al. eds., May 2019); Watson
Health, Bridging the data-to-study gap to solve Rare Disease research challenges,
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oracles.” 63 Otherwise, for example, the deferential treatment
that the broadly powered administrative state now enjoys
from the judiciary may cement agencies’ algorithmicallymediated decisions in place as unchallengeable, even where
AI systems and their input data and models and their uses
are inaccurate, grossly racialized, or deeply problematic. 64
The elephant must be demystified. Otherwise, these
issues will obscure the distinctions upon which legal
decisions turn, 65 enabling AI’s unilluminated black boxes to
have profound legal consequences. 66 Otherwise, the danger
IBM (May 24, 2021), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson-health/bridging-thedata-to-study-gap-to-solve-rare-disease-research-challenges/ (last visited Dec. 8,
2021).
63. See Eidelman, supra note 60, at 923; Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d
1170, 1174 n.1 (Pa. 2006) (contrasting “product of neutral infallible artificial
intelligence” with demonstrative computer animation in jury trial (emphasis
supplied)); Eric Wang, What Does It Really Mean for an Algorithm to be Biased?,
THE GRADIENT (May 1, 2018), https://thegradient.pub/ai-bias/ (Some tend to
“think algorithmic reasoning is always rational and objective, regardless of the
situation. They might even believe that uncomfortable or undesirable results of
the data simply reflect ‘politically incorrect’ truths in the data.”).
64. See Zirkle Fruit Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 442 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1382 (E.D.
Wash. 2020) (“[A]t most this renders the dataset imperfect.”); James A. Allen,
The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for
Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 223 (2019); EXEC.
ETHICS COMM’N OF STATE OF ILLINOIS, OEIG FINAL REP’T (REDACTED) 36–37, 39
(2017) (Eckerd Rapid Safety Feedback system used in child welfare system);
OKLA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SVC’S, SFTP APPLICATION SPECIFICATIONS MINDSHARE
HRDM TIII Program 1, 4, https://www.muckrock.com/foi/oklahoma-248/okla
homa-department-of-human-services-eckerd-rapid-safety-feedback-74007/#file818375 (last visited Nov. 16. 2021) (finding 70% error rate in child risk prediction
using above-referenced Eckerd system). Thanks to my Artificial Intelligence and
Social Justice students Diana Bruce, Chelsea Hill, and Jared Myers for these two
cited Eckerd-related sources. See also generally Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding
Over the Cracks: Predictive Analytics and Child Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
307 (2019) (discussing Eckerd system).
65. See, e.g., Neuromedical Sys., Inc. v. NeoPath, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 5245(JFK),
1998 WL 264845, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998) (discussing plaintiff Neopath’s
“fuzzy decision tree”-equipped system, and stating that “[NeoPath’s] neural
network is a ‘black box’ where reasoning for the neural network’s decision cannot
be traced through the neural network to explain its decision rationale”).
66. See, e.g., People v. Super. Ct. (Dominguez), 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 76, 84
(Ct. App. 2018) (granting discovery relief in murder conspiracy case where
petitioner sought “right to look inside the proverbial ‘black box’” of probabilistic
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is that humanity will self-subjugate to Dark Law. This is a
post-humanist construct that will rise, if unchecked, from
AI’s great capacity to approximate law and from the rapid
rise of algorithmic government regimes, including as
outsourced to private companies. 67 Otherwise, AI’s code, big
data, and statistical models become law, 68 and people its
impotent, fungible objects, reduced to mere data production
units. 69
C. Inadequate Adherence to Ethical Duties
As elaborated in the next Section, Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rules) 1.1 and 1.3 establish the attorneys’ ethical
duties and standards of technological competence and
diligence, respectively. 70 Few ethical complaints have been
adjudicated as to alleged violations of competency and
related diligence, however, and none involving AI seems to
have yet appeared. There may be several underlying causes
for this apparent dearth of ethical enforcement as to
technological competency and associated diligence.
Whatever the causes, the problem is that compliance with
DNA genotyping system).
67. See O’NEIL, supra note 49, at 30–31; Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman,
Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 114–18,
126–28 (2018) (predictive algorithms and big data analytics as a form of
governance); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving GovernanceBy-Design, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 722 (2018); Christoph B. Graber, Freedom and
Affordances of the Net, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 221, 239 (2018) (de facto
regulatory power of online market dominators); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony
Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1421 (2017); Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1149 (2017); Omer Tene &
Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic Decisionmaking, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 146–60 (2017).
68. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 60 (1999).
69. See Emile Loza de Siles, Slave.io, Remarks at Biennial 2021 LatCrit
Conference, University of Denver Sturm College of Law (Oct. 9, 2021) (transcript
on file with author); Emile Loza de Siles, New Directions in Law and Society
Workshop, Center for Justice, Law, and Societies at University of Massachusetts
Amherst (Oct. 9, 2021) (transcript on file with author).
70. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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these ethical duties remains a matter of self-enforcement.
That is the elephant in the room.
II. THE GROUNDWORK
This Section lays a two-part foundation toward a more
comprehensive view of artificial intelligence. First, it
discusses the ethical requirements for all lawyers, including
licensed lawyers who are law professors, to attain and
maintain AI competency through diligence. Second, the
Article sketches out a mental model for conceptualizing and
better understanding AI. That model derives from a
proposed taxonomy for comprehending AI as a process, a
useful approach where legal analyses and recommendations
must first deconstruct the AI process to properly analyze,
better theorize, and govern it.
A. The Ethical Requirements: ABA Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3
Artificial intelligence is broadly relevant, irrespective of
practice, doctrinal, clinical, or judicial focus. 71 “Deliberate
ignorance of technology is inexcusable.” 72 Everyone in, or
headed into, the legal profession has, or will have, ethical
duties to diligently learn about AI and its underlying
technologies to become sufficiently competent and stay that
way. 73

71. See Emile Loza de Siles, The Future Is Now: Top Ten Strategic Technology
Trends & Competence in Practice, Remarks at Idaho State Bar Ann. Meeting
(July 13, 2017) (transcript on file with author); Shannon Brown, Peeking Inside
the Black Box: A Preliminary Survey of Technology Assisted Review (TAR) and
Predictive Coding Algorithms for Ediscovery, 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.
221, 227–29 (2016).
72. James v. Nat’l Fin. LLC, Case No. CV-8931-VCL, 2014 WL 6845560, at
*12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2014) (quoting Judith L. Maute, Facing 21st Century
Realities, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 345, 369 (2013)).
73. See Wilson Ray Huhn, A Proposed Code of Ethics of Law Educators, 6 J.
L. & RELIGION 25 (1988). But see id. at 29 (“Incompetence on the part of a law
teacher is not necessarily unethical.”). Most law professors likely are licensed
attorneys, but research did not reveal the professoriate’s licensure rate.
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Rules 1.1 and 1.3 establish the ethical duties and
standards of technological competence and diligence,
respectively. 74 These two duties are tightly coupled.
Sufficient competency is achieved through diligence. 75
Where disciplinary actions are brought on competency
grounds under Rule 1.1, failures of diligence under Rule 1.3
are often also alleged with those failures almost always being
the cause of the competency breaches. 76
1. Ethical Duty of Technological Competence
Rule 1.1 reads: “A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 77
Each of the elements under Rule 1.1 must be achieved to a
reasonableness standard, that is, reflecting “conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.” 78
Necessary study to the level of reasonable preparation
enables a lawyer to achieve an ethically appropriate level of
AI competency. 79 The reasonableness standard is met as to
AI-related matters when, at a minimum, the lawyer can
sufficiently assess the circumstances and then accurately
spot legal issues. 80 A cautionary note, however, is not to
overly rely upon Comment 5 to Rule 1.1, where it indicates
that the required level of attention and preparation turns, in
part, on the client’s interests at stake. 81 Indeed, the very core

74. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
75. See id. at 1.1 cmt. 2.
76. See, e.g., Atty. Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 872 A.2d 693, 703 (Md.
2005) (subsequent history omitted); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, W. WILLIAM HODES &
PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 4–7 (4th ed., 2014) (citing id.).
77. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
78. Id. r. 1.0(h).
79. See id. r. 1.1 cmts. 2, 4.
80. See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 2.
81. See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 5.
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of a lawyer’s ability to determine what client interests are at
stake in an AI-related matter depends upon the lawyer
having sufficient, indeed, perhaps “the most fundamental,”
legal skill: to spot the issues that may elucidate what those
interests are. 82 In addition, the AI-competent lawyer must be
able to: accurately identify and analyze appropriate legal
precedent; identify and evaluate the relevant facts and legal
elements and then to apply those facts to the law; and
appropriately draft legal documents. 83 As to whether the
attorney’s legal knowledge and skills related to AI are
reasonable, the commentary to the Rule provides a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider. 84
2. Ethical Duty of Diligence
Rule 1.3 reads: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.” 85 Rule
1.3 requires the attorney’s zealous advocacy of and
dedication and commitment to the client’s interests. 86 The
ethical duties as to AI under Rule 1.3 are dependent upon
ethical compliance with the Rule 1.1 duty of competency. If
the level of AI competency is ethically insufficient, then
zealous advocacy, dedication, and commitment are
undermined, if not rendered impossible, and are not a matter
merely left to the lawyer’s exercise of professional
discretion. 87 As a consequence, the Rule 1.3 duty of diligence
likewise may be breached when there is an AI competency
breach under Rule 1.1.

82. Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 2.
83. See id. r. 1.1 cmts. 2, 5.
84. See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (listing lawyer’s general experience, lawyer’s training
and experience in the relevant field, preparation and study lawyer can commit to
the matter, relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, and
feasibility to consult or refer the matter to another lawyer established in the
relevant field as factors).
85. Id. r. 1.3.
86. See id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
87. See id.
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This Section has discussed the twin ethical duties of
technological competence and diligence assigned to licensed
attorneys, the satisfaction of which are constant
requirements, as emphasized by the ABA’s Commission on
Ethics 20/20. 88 These duties are the minimum performance
requirements incumbent upon lawyers as to AI. Fortunately,
there are multiple strategies by which to meet these required
standards, 89 and this Article aims to help toward that end.
B. The Mental Model: AI as a Human-Machine Enterprise
Comprised of Processes
A world-renowned giant in quality engineering, Dr. W.
Edwards Deming minced no words: “If you can’t describe
what you are doing as a process, you don’t know what you’re
doing.” 90 A process engineering discipline and its
corresponding methodologies serve the purposes of breaking
down the problem set, that is, the system, here of AI, for
which understanding and mastery of control are sought, into
iteratively discrete subunits in that overall process. 91 This
88. See Ann M. Murphy, Is It Safe? The Need for State Ethical Rules to Keep
Pace with Technological Advances, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651, 1661 (2013)
(quoting Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers Have Duty to Stay Current on
Technology’s Risks and Benefits, New Model Ethics Comment Says, ABA J. (Aug.
6, 2012, 7:46 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_have_duty
_to_stay_current_on_technologys_risks_and_benefits); ABA Comm’n on Ethics
20/20, Resolution 105A (2012).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmts. 2, 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020);
James v. Nat’l Fin. LLC, No. CV-8931-VCL, 2014 WL 6845560, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 5, 2014) (quoting Judith L. Maute, Facing 21st Century Realities, 32 MISS.
C. L. REV. 345, 369 (2013)). But see also Mia. Bus. Servs., LLC v. Davis, 299 P.3d
477, 487 (Okla. 2013) (commentary to professional conduct rules are persuasive
interpretative tools, but not binding). As to competency strategies, see Emile Loza
de Siles, supra note 71.
90. See Jane K. Winn, Reports of a Blockchain Revolution in Trade Finance
Are Greatly Exaggerated 18 (Jan. 27, 2020) (unpublished draft)
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526521) (quoting Deming); see also W. Edwards
Deming Quotes, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/310261
.W_Edwards_Deming (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
91. Some opt for “lifecycle,” rather than “process.” See Eric Horvitz, Comm’r,
Nat’l Sec. Comm’n on A.I. & Chief Sci. Officer, Microsoft Corp., Remarks at the
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deconstruction enables careful analyses of each subunit as a
separate inquiry; the mapping of how those subunits interact
and the dependencies and interdependencies of those
interactions; and a deeply and more accurately
comprehensive understanding of the overall system-asprocess.
Aligning with Dr. Deming’s’ straight talk, this Article
conceives a mental model of AI as it is: a human-machine
enterprise, an enterprise in which humans and machines are
engaged in common in a systematized set of processes to be
understood in detail, engineered, optimized, examined, and
controlled. In keeping with its aims to lay a descriptive and
comprehensive foundation for the legal understanding of AI
technologies, this Article leaves the enterprise aspects of the
model for another work and concentrates on processes. It
considers a systematized AI process to be documented in the
legal lexicon; deconstructed into its component subunits,
process sequences, interactions, and dependencies; and
analyzed in detail with clarity, rigor, and according to the
law, or the law to be, within applicable technological and use
case contexts. As one of its principal advantages, the model
serves vital translating, orienting, and mapping functions. 92
As with any process, the AI-as-process model encompasses
inputs, outputs, and interacting dependencies. 93
Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech. (NIST), Exploring AI Trustworthiness Kickoff
Webinar (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2020/08
/exploring-ai-trustworthiness-workshop-series-kickoff-webinar.
92. See W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEW ECONOMICS
GOVERNMENT, EDUCATION 63 (3d ed. 2018).

FOR

INDUSTRY,

93. This process view of AI as a human-machine enterprise model integrates
concepts from three disciplines: process engineering; strategic business
management, particularly product marketing; and legal landscape modeling. The
model’s first part invokes process engineering principles and focuses on three
inanimate categories of AI inputs: data, statistical models, and algorithms. There
is a fourth and human-driven category of AI input encompassing AI design:
market deployment; use cases, uses, disuses, and misuses.
The model’s second part groups AI outputs into three categories: the
computational results produced by AI system use, such as recidivism risk score;
outcomes, such as a harsher prison sentence extended, in part, based upon that
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The basic purpose of an AI system is to predict outputs
based upon inputs. 94 Input data—more specifically, the
predictors, or “features,” 95 within data sets—are the group of
independent variables that impact upon one or more AI
system outputs, and that are subject to dependencies within
the process. 96 This Article focuses on the three principal
types of inanimate inputs in an AI system: data, statistical
models, and algorithms.
Harkening to the elephant in question, this process
model offers to wise ones, well-sighted in the worlds of law
and policy, but less well so in engineering, computer science,
cognitive science, mathematics and statistics, and
technology-driven business, to see AI as a system and,
score; and impacts as the logical, if unanticipated, consequences of AI system use,
such as the racial biases in some recidivism risk predictive systems that, in turn,
result in disproportionate numbers of people of color being given such harsher
sentences. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 770–71 (Wis. 2016);
Katherine Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How the
Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis,
18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75 (2016).
The model’s third part identifies four categories of significant associations, or
“dependencies,” that exist between, interoperate with, and impact upon AI inputs
and outputs. See Process Dependency Analysis Technique, PROJECT MGMT. INST.,
https://www.projectmanagement.com/process/popup.cfm?ID=23931 (last visited
Dec. 8, 2021). Those categories are: (1) AI subjects, meaning principally, but not
exclusively, the individual human persons who are exposed to a particular AI
system and as whom the system is to operate; (2) AI market participants, those
being the public and private organizations that design, develop, and deploy AI
systems; (3) AI end users who operate a given AI system or otherwise procure
outputs from its use; and (4) AI markets, conceived broadly to encompass the
applications, use cases, industry sectors, and other market categories as to which
AI systems are directed. Id.
94. See TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE
ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION
9–10 (2d ed. 2009).
95. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (appeal, in part, from patent claim construction by trial court
defining “feature” as “a property or attribute of data which may take on a set of
values”); accord, e.g., Mohammed Osman & Edward Imwinkelried, Facial
Recognition Systems, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 695, 713 (2014) (likening feature
extraction in facial recognition systems to identifying points of comparison in
latent fingerprinting techniques).
96. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, at 9.
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moreover, the human-machine enterprise that it is. It
provides the sight to see that the trunk is connected to the
giant head affixed to which are great fan-like ears and, in
turn, to a mountainous back, tall-walled sides, tree trunk
legs, and thick ropey tail.
The parable and the Jain doctrine expressed therein
teach that “all viewpoints with no exception are false views
when strictly related to their respective spheres . . . ;
however, when understood as mutually dependent, they
become viewpoints conducive to truth.” 97 Therefore, toward
a truth-conducive end, this Article builds toward an
interdisciplinary, that is, many-sided, mental map by which
to conceptualize the whole of AI and its intersectionalities
with and relevancies to the law.
Before that map becomes interpretable, however, a
common and informed language of AI is needed, a set of
defining terms that form cornerstones for the discussion.
Next, this Article turns to the lexiconic morass in an attempt
to sort and read the technical language of AI into a collective
legal understanding, starting with AI, its types, and the
inputs that engender it.
III. THE ELEPHANT
Some eighty years ago, Alan Turing laid down his
systems of logic 98 that, in turn and with other ideas, gave
birth to today’s “thinking machines.” 99 During that span of
time, those in computer science and other AI disciplines have
developed
robust
terminologies,
theories,
and
97. Balcerowicz, supra note 15, at 41 (citation and internal punctuation
omitted).
98. See Alan M. Turing, Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals, in ALAN TURING’S
SYSTEMS OF LOGIC: THE PRINCETON THESIS 31–140 (Andrew W. Appel, ed. 2012)
(Turing’s 1939 doctoral thesis).
99. Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433, 436
(1950) (“thinking machine”). Turing’s publication was the “first serious, scholarly
treatment of the concept of artificial intelligence.” MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 1 n.1, 233 n.1 (2015).
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understandings of their creations. 100 In law, however, AIrelated work has only recently begun in earnest. The law has
neither achieved consensus as to the meanings of “artificial
intelligence” and related terms nor methodically and
comprehensively catalogued, mapped, or adopted the
scientific, technological, and mathematical terms of the AI
arts into the legal vernacular.
The Article’s next two Sections contribute to the
understanding of AI terminology and present contexts for the
application of those terms and their understanding in the
law. All large and arduous efforts are daunting, and this one
is no less so. Never fear. There is but one answer to the
question, “How do you eat an elephant?!” The response is
always “One bite at a time.”
This Section presents that feast in three courses. First,
it maps out the meaning of “artificial intelligence” and
rationalizes the multiplicity of potentially confusing ways in
which the term is used. Second, it offers some
straightforward, but powerful taxonomic tools with which to
categorize types of AI in legally relevant ways. Third, it drills
down on “dynamic artificial intelligence,” arguably the most
legally impactful type of artificial intelligence, to parse out
important machine learning models. In this last part, the
Article also starts helping to build neural pathways toward
some exotic types of dynamic AI as may wander otherwise
unrecognized into the law’s villages.

100. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN SOCIETY ch. 1 (2019) (ebook), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/eedfee77-en/1/2/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication
/eedfee77-en&_csp_=5c39a73676a331d76fa56f36ff0d4aca&itemIGO=oecd&item
ContentType=book (last visited Nov. 7, 2021) (providing “A Short History of
Artificial Intelligence”).

1418

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

A. What Is Artificial Intelligence?
The definition of AI is varied 101 and the subject of much
thought. 102 This next discussion briefly unpacks some useful
levels of meaning for “artificial intelligence” like a set of
Russian nesting elephants to facilitate a clearer discernment
and discussion when analyzing AI.
As a discipline, AI is an interdisciplinary branch of
computer science that deals with models and data processing
systems for the performance, emulation, or recreation of
functions that earlier have been associated with human
intelligence, such as reasoning, learning, and selfimprovement. 103 As a capability, the masters who dreamed
up the concept of AI had ideas as to what AI is. Turing
considered artificial intelligence to be the ability of digital
computers to imitate humans in typed conversational
exchanges to such a remarkable degree as to be
indistinguishable from human conversants. 104 Fast forward
101. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S.
LEADERSHIP IN AI: PLAN OUTLINES PRIORITIES FOR FEDERAL AGENCY ENGAGEMENT
IN AI STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 7 (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/system
/files/documents/2019/08/10/ai_standards_fedengagement_plan_9aug2019.pdf.
102. See, e.g., AI Researcher: Stop Calling Everything “Artificial Intelligence,”
MIND MATTERS NEWS (Apr. 7, 2021), https://mindmatters.ai/2021/04/airesearcher-stop-calling-everything-artificial-intelligence/; SOFIA SAMOILI ET AL.,
EUR. COMM’N JOINT RSCH. CTR., AI WATCH: DEFINING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 7–
9,
15–85
(2020),
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle
/JRC118163; Selmer Bringsjord & Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu, Artificial
Intelligence, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2020)
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/artificial-intelligence/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2021) (especially What Exactly Is AI? in Section 2).
103. See Artificial Intelligence, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition
/artificial_intelligence (last visited Nov. 7, 2021); HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON
A.I., EUR. COMM’N, A DEFINITION OF AI: MAIN CAPABILITIES AND SCIENTIFIC
DISCIPLINES 7 (Dec. 18, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged
/ai_hleg_definition_of_ai_18_december_1.pdf.
104. See Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, supra note 99, at 433.
John McCarthy and his colleagues in the landmark 1955 Dartmouth AI summer
project had similar thoughts of defining AI by its human imitative capacity. See
JOHN MCCARTHY, MARVIN L. MINSKY, NATHANIEL ROCHESTER & CLAUDE E.
SHANNON, A PROPOSAL FOR THE DARTMOUTH SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT ON
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and the International Organization for Standardization,
known as ISO, and International Electrotechnical
Commission, known as IEC, have harmonized their
definition of artificial intelligence as the “capability of a
functional unit to perform functions that are generally
associated with human intelligence such as reasoning and
learning.” 105
Collectively, an artificial intelligence system may be
called simply an artificial intelligence or, singularly or
plurally, “AI.” 106 An AI is a computational engine that is
comprised of software, firmware, or hardware or a
combination thereof; includes one or more databases or
access to such; and, in very simple terms, runs on a
computer. 107 In reality, AI are instantiated in a dazzling

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 11 (Aug. 31, 1955) [hereinafter DARTMOUTH PROJECT],
http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/dartmouth/dartmouth.pdf (characterizing project
focus as “making a machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a
human were so behaving”).
105. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM.,
ISO/IEC 2382:2015, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY – VOCABULARY (2015) [hereinafter
ISO/IEC 2382:2015], https://www.iso.org/standard/63598.html.
106. AIs are frequently anthropomorphized and gendered as “female.” See
generally Emile Loza de Siles, AI, on the Law of Being: “Feminine” Imagery in
Humanoid Robots, Evolving Law as to What Constitutes a Human (Duquesne
Univ. Sch. of L. Rsch., Paper No. 2020-12, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3658667; James Veitch, Siri vs Alexa, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_1dhKsELzs; see also Kate
Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in
ROBOT LAW 213–31 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016)
[hereinafter ROBOT LAW].
107. NIST has collaboratively defined AI systems “to comprise software and/or
hardware that can learn to solve complex problems, make predictions or
undertake tasks that require human-like sensing (such as vision, speech, and
touch), perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical
action.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. LEADERSHIP
IN AI: PLAN OUTLINES PRIORITIES FOR FEDERAL AGENCY ENGAGEMENT IN AI
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 7–8 (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/system
/files/documents/2019/08/10/ai_standards_fedengagement_plan_9aug2019.pdf.
This definition, however, focuses only on machine learning and is thus narrower
than “artificial intelligence,” which also encompasses non-learning AI systems.
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diversity of form factors, 108 across multi-core and multiple
other processing configurations, and globally and even extraglobally distributed locations. 109 The form factors,
108. It may run on sensors inside a robot, an implanted medical device, or a
self-driving vehicle, for example. See, e.g., Alexandros Gazis, Evangelos Ioannou
& Eleftheria Katsiri, Examining the Sensors that Enable Self-driving Vehicles,
39 IEEE POTENTIALS, Jan./Feb. 2020, at 46. AI may run on the tiniest
microprocessors to newly huge ones. See, e.g., Stacey Higginbotham, Machine
Learning on the Edge, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM, Jan. 2020, at 20 (tiny machine
learning); Samuel K. Moore, Huge Chip Smashes Deep-Learning’s Speed Barrier,
57 IEEE SPECTRUM, Jan. 2020, at 24, 24–25, 27 (expectations that Cerebra’s new
dinner plate-sized chip, i.e., more than 50 times larger than any commercially
available chip, will enable training of deep learning neural network systems to
occur within hours, not weeks).
Form factors in which AI may be increasingly embodied include, for example,
handheld microcontrollers. See, e.g., Limor Fried, Making Machine Learning
Arduino Compatible: A Gaming Handheld that Runs Neural Networks, 56 IEEE
SPECTRUM, Aug. 2019, at 14. Furthermore, the component parts of an AI may be
distributed, including in locations across the globe and beyond. See, e.g., Mina
Mitry, Routers in Space, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM, Feb. 2020, at 39. Finally, AI systems
may be combinatorial, such as multilingual virtual “assistants” bringing together
AI and cloud-mediated speech capabilities to serve those transiting German train
stations and airports. See AI Operator Standing By, 56 IEEE SPECTRUM, Aug.
2019, at 13.
109. For example, AI may run on processors that are accessed through online
cloud computing or under fog or edge computing models. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. 18-CV-00507-YGR, 2019 WL 1427660, at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
29, 2019) (cloud computing); NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. BIG DATA PUB.
WORKING GRP., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NIST BIG DATA INTEROPERABILITY
FRAMEWORK: VOLUME 1, DEFINITIONS § 4.3.2, at 19 (2018) [hereinafter NIST BIG
DATA DEFINITIONS], https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1500-1r1 (hybrid clouds);
Yuan Ai, Mugen Peng & Kecheng Zhang, Edge Computing Technologies for
Internet of Things: A Primer, 4 DIGITAL COMMC’NS & NETWORKS 77, 78 (2018); AI
Operation Standing By, supra note 108, at 13–20 (fog computing).
Increasingly, AI operates within cyberphysical systems, which consist of
interacting physical and digital components connected by closed networks or the
Internet. See Stefano Zanero, Cyber-Physical Systems, 50 COMPUTER 14, 14 (2017)
(publication of IEEE COMPUT. SOC’Y); Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian
Wachsmann & Michael Waidner, Security and Privacy Challenges in Industrial
Internet of Things, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52ND ANNUAL DESIGN AUTOMATION
CONFERENCE 1 (2015), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2744769.2747942; NIST
BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra, § 4.3.3, at 20; see also, e.g., Emile Loza de Siles,
Google Glass: Wearable Technology for a Better Life for Persons with Autism
Spectrum Disorder & Other Medical Conditions (July 13, 2018) (Harvard
eportolio) (on file with author); Cyber Physical Systems Security, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cpssec (last visited
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configurations, and loci of an AI may present numerous
jurisdictional and other legal issues. 110
B. Legal Taxonomies for AI Decisional Context and System
Mutability
This framework discussion introduces two organizing
perspectives among the anekāntavāda that is AI-aselephant. To think about and analyze AI, it is useful to
categorize the subject system as follows: (1) by the decisional
context of its use as an automated decision system versus an
automated decision support system; and (2) the mutability of
the system’s operational character as comparatively static or
dynamic. Note that these two ways of categorizing AI
systems of categorization are not mutually exclusive. For
example, an AI system under scrutiny could be used as an
automated decision support tool and likewise be relatively
immutable, that is, operationally static. The following
sketches out helpful ways to frame the elephant as we read
and think further about AI and the law.
Dec. 8, 2021).
AI operates within sensors and other devices connected via the Internet of Things
(IoT) or the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS,
supra, § 4.3.3, at 20; Emile Loza de Siles, Cybersecurity Law & Emerging
Technologies: The Federal Trade Commission, Reasonable Security Measures,
and IoT, IEEE FUTURE DIRECTIONS: TECH. POL’Y & ETHICS (May 2017),
https://cmte.ieee.org/futuredirections/tech-policy-ethics/may-2017/cybersecuritylaw-and-emerging-technologies-part-1/ (text accompanying nn.29–34); Sadeghi
et al., supra, at 1.
110. See JONAH FORCE HILL & MATTHEW NOYCE, NEW AMERICA, RETHINKING
DATA, GEOGRAPHY, AND JURISDICTION 2 (Feb. 2018); see, e.g., Bernard Marr, What
Is the Artificial Intelligence of Things? When AI Meets IoT, FORBES (DEC. 20,
2019,12:22AM ), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/12/20/what-isthe-artificial-intelligence-of-things-when-ai-meets-iot/?sh=107f85d7b1fd; NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., Consumer Cybersecurity Labeling for IoT Devices: A
Q&A with NIST’s Katerina Megas, TAKING MEASURE BLOG (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://www.nist.gov/blogs/taking-measure/consumer-cybersecurity-labeling-iotdevices-qa-nists-katerina-megas; Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1004–05 (2014) (“This trend of firms initiating the
interaction with the consumer will only accelerate as our thermometers,
appliances, glasses, watches, and other artifacts become networked into an
‘Internet of Things.’”).
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1. Decisional Use Context: Automated Decision System
or Automated Decision Support System?
AI systems fall into one of two decisional use contexts:
automated decision systems (ADS) or automated decision
support systems (ADSS). The distinction between these two
categories is in the presence and involvement of human
mediation in the decision toward which the computational
power of the AI system is directed. No direct human
mediation exists in the former, but some degree of human
mediation exists in the latter. Within the ADSS decisional
context, there likely is a range of the degrees of human
mediation or a sliding scale running from minimally humanmediated at one end to fully human-mediated at the other.
In the former category, ADS are used to computationally
produce a result, and that result, when applied against some
predefined threshold, produces the final decision or de facto
final decision. An online credit application system is an
example. 111 Briefly, the credit applicant provides the
required information. Within seconds, the AI-equipped
system operates, accessing the individual’s credit score and
history, along with the applicant-provided information and
other undisclosed dark data from social media and other
organizations. 112 The system computes and returns a result
in the binary form of credit approval or disapproval. No
human acts or is likely to act to mediate the computationally
driven decision. The AI system is an automated decision
system, and its computed result equates to the credit
decision and is, respectively, final or de facto final.
An ADSS, by contrast, does not produce an autonomous
decision, but rather computes results that are presented to
human decisionmakers who, in turn, make the subject
111. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
112. See Janine S. Hiller, Fairness in the Eyes of the Beholder: AI, Fairness,
and Alternative Credit Scoring, 123 W. VA. L. REV. 907, 923–24 (2021); Matthew
Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12–17 (2018).
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decision. For example, judges use recidivism or violence risk
predictive systems in sentencing and other decisions. 113
Because the ADSS result is mediated by humans and,
presumably, their appropriate discretion, judgment,
contextual understanding, and intuition, 114 human decisionmaking is to be informed and facilitated by the AI system’s
result, but not autonomously supplanted by it, as in the case
of ADS.
The distinctions between AI system autonomy and
gradations of human mediation in resultant decision-making
present a helpful framework for exploring AI risk and the
assignment of liability and other legal responsibilities within
the human-machine enterprise. 115 Among other impacts to
consider when applying this ADS-ADSS taxonomy is
whether the actual use of the system aligns with its intended
and designed use. For example, the use by courts of an AI
system for sentencing decisions when the system was
intended and designed only to inform probation decisions 116
113. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016) (Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) system
used in sentencing decision); see also, e.g., Henderson v. Stensberg, No. 18-cv555-jdp, 2021 WL 1221249, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2021) (COMPAS used by
parole commission).
114. Government decision-making may overly rely on or misapply the results
of ADSS. See, e.g., Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 65–66, 69–70,
85–104 (2018) (discussing “off-label” use of AI, or use of AI system for other than
its intended and designed purpose); Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769–70 (discussing
use of COMPAS risk recidivism system in sentencing, and stating that “COMPAS
was not developed for use at sentencing”). But see Order , In re T.K. (D.C. Super.
Ct. Mar. 15, 2018) [hereinafter SAVRY Order] (Granting, in Part, Respondent’s
Motion to Exclude Results of the Violence Risk Assessment and all Related
Testimony and/or Allocution Under FRE 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals).
115. Compare, e.g., SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 119–51 (2011), with Curtis E.A. Karnow, The
Application of Traditional Tort Theory in Embodied Machine Intelligence, in
ROBOT LAW, supra note 106, at 51–77; see also Reux Stearns et al., Panel 2:
Accountability for the Actions of Robots, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1101, 1101–03,
1108 (2018) (remarks of Howard Jay Chizeck, debating proposed liability
taxonomies where robots or human-robot collaborations result in kinetic action).
116. See Cary Coglianese & Lavi M. Ben Dor, AI in Adjudication and
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would require adjustment along the autonomous versus
human-mediated decisional spectrum. These and other
considerations could further inform this decisional use
context model toward helping to discern, analyze, and make
informed conclusions about the AI-relevant facts and legal
issues. 117
2. Operational Character: Static or Dynamic Artificial
Intelligence?
AI systems also may be classified by the mutability of
their operational character as being relatively static or
dynamic AI. 118 A static AI has its operations fixed in
accordance with its software code or other enabling
structure. The operation of a static AI system has no internal
dynamism by which the system modifies its statistical
modeling or other ways of reaching its results in real time,
or “on the fly,” as the vernacular goes. Although they may
and should be updated, static AI systems do not “learn” as
dynamic AI systems do.
The Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth AI
system (SAVRY) is one such static AI. The SAVRY product
is an AI-based violence risk prediction tool. 119 With SAVRY,
Administration, 11–12 n.47, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://scholarship
.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3120&context=faculty_scholarship.
117. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the
Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16–44 (2018) (considering
tort law and attribution of causation and liability after first known death in
autonomous vehicle crash in 2016). See generally, e.g., Yu, supra note 5.
118. Some categorize AI as being “rules-based,” “coded,” or “scripted,” on one
hand, meaning the subject AI system’s operation is by rote processing in
accordance with the applicable software code and “data-driven” or “learning” on
the other hand, meaning the system is machine learning-based. See, e.g.,
Casandra Laskowski, Tech. & Empirical Servs. Libr., Univ. of Ariz. James E.
Rogers Coll. of L., Remarks at the Am. Ass’n of L. Schs. AI Fundamentals for
Faculty Webinar (July 15, 2020), https://ncculaw.zoom.us/webinar/register
/WN_UbsWdoHcTc21MLp5JvwCKQ (on-demand webinar, see especially slides
5–6).
119. See AI NOW LITIGATING ALGORITHMS, supra note 48, at 13 (“Studies on
Violence Risk in Youth”). As to this AI, the user or the consumer of the system’s
output does not have access or visibility to computation, reference data,
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the user, a probation officer or psychologist, for example,
interviews the subject youth to glean information with which
to complete a SAVRY rating form. 120 Through that form, the
SAVRY user distills and captures violence risk predictive
and protective factors as being low, moderate, or high levels
or present or absent. 121 The user then reports out his or her
estimate for the youth’s risk of violent behavior. 122 The
system’s underlying input data, computational models,
weighting of factors, and so on are fixed and are not updated
during its operation. 123
By contrast, a dynamic AI system may be mutable in two
aspects. First, it learns its modeling and thus function
through mechanisms not explicitly programmed for it in
code. 124 Second, the data upon which its modeling is based or
statistical models, and algorithms. Rather, the distribution model for this AI
system occurs via a manual, rating forms, and training. See, e.g., JOHN S. RYALS,
JR., JEFFERSON PARISH DEP’T OF JUV. SERVS., 2013 SCREENING & ASSESSMENT
MANUAL 13 paras. 1 & 2(a), 14 para. 3(c) (2013), https://jefferson-parishgovernment.azureedge.net/documents/departments/juvenile-services/juvenilejustice-reform-publications/ScreeningAssessmentManual-2013-09-01.pdf;
SAVRY – Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth, ANN ARBOR
PUBLISHERS, https://www.annarbor.co.uk/index.php?main_page=index&cPath=
416_419_189 (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
120. See, e.g., Ryals, supra note 119, at 13 para. 1, 29–48, apps. 1–5; SAVRY
Motion, supra note 48, at 2, para. 3; Child Guidance Clinic, District of Columbia
Courts, Clinical Staff, https://web.archive.org/web/20210809020140/https:
//www.dccourts.gov/services/juvenile-matters/child-guidance (last visited Dec. 3,
2021) (Dr. Woodland).
121. See SAVRY Motion, supra note 48, at Ex. 2 (SAVRY criteria summary
sheet).
122. See SAVRY Order, supra note 114, at 3. Under this Article’s taxonomy,
the SAVRY system is an ADSS.
123. The SAVRY system appears to be infrequently updated, although it
recently migrated to an online platform. See ARK. DEP’T OF YOUTH SERV.’S, SAVRY
2.0 RELEASE NOTES (June 8, 2020), https://www.arcourts.gov/sites/default/files
/SAVRY_2.0_DYS_Release%20Notes.pdf; see also Randy Borum, Patrick Bartel,
& Adelle Forth, Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth, PAR, INC.
(2019) (system apparently originating 2006).
124. INT’L. ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 20252:2019, MARKET, OPINION AND
SOCIAL RESEARCH, INCLUDING INSIGHTS AND DATA ANALYTICS – VOCABULARY AND
SERVICE REQUIREMENTS § 3 [hereinafter ISO 20252:2019], https://www.iso.org
/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:20252:ed-3:v1:en (last visited Dec. 8, 2021) (Entry No. 3.52).
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other internal aspects of a dynamic AI system may change
its computational trajectory on the fly. 125 The AI system
iteratively operates in a state of dynamic flux, always, for
example, toward its selection of the best outcome under its
data and other conditions. Machine learning systems are
dynamic AI under this taxonomy, with self-programming
systems being perhaps the most dynamic of all. 126
One analytical utility of this comparative taxonomy of
AIs is that the proof of facts, determinations as to
appropriate governance, the conceptualization of proposed
theories of liability, and other legal analyses generally may
be more straightforwardly applied to static AI but more
complex in application to dynamic AI. In addition, the scale
and rapidity of informational injury 127 and other harms that
may result from these two operational types of AI may be
markedly distinguishable. As a general principal, the greater
the mutability of an AI system, the greater the risk of
potential harms that could arise from its use. Thus, the use
of dynamic AI presents a greater potential for and more
rapidly produced harms. In an earlier version, this Article
proposed that, this static-dynamic dichotomy could supply
an appropriate risk perspective from which to prioritize the
formulation and deployment of informed AI legislation in the

This is not to suggest that machine learning systems learn autonomously without
human decision-making in the design and development process. See, e.g., Chanin
Nantasenamat, How to Build a Machine Learning Model, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NRnaMCNOK7Y.
125. See, e.g., Hiller, supra note 112, at 908–09, 923–24, 927–32.
126. See, e.g., Pure Predictive, Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO,
2017 WL 3721480, at *1–2, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017) (describing invention
claimed in “Predictive Analytics Factory” patent, see U.S. Patent No. 8,880,446
(issued Nov. 4, 2014)) (subsequent history omitted); Human Labeling, GOOGLE
CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/vision/automl/docs/human-labeling (last visited
Dec. 8, 2021) (Google’s AutoML self-programming artificial intelligence).
127. See FTC INFORMATIONAL INJURY WORKSHOP: BE AND BCP STAFF
PERSPECTIVE, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/ftc-informational-injury-workshop-be-bcp-staff-p
erspective/informational_injury_workshop_staff_report_-_oct_2018_0.pdf.
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vast landscape now populated by rogue AI elephants. 128
Since-proposed AI legislation is proceeding along similar risk
perspectives. 129
C. What Is Machine Learning?
Machine learning is a subset of AI that may be
categorized as operationally dynamic under the second
sorting framework posited supra in Section III.B.2. This
Section defines and describes machine learning generally
calling upon the work of leading technological organizations
and institutions. The Article then illustrates how a machine
learning system operates by reference to an exemplar patent.
Next, it discusses how computational machines learn and,
with that information onboarded, the two principal models of
machine learning: supervised and unsupervised learning,
models that are less cabined than their adjectives suggest.
The Section closes by sketching a spectrum model as a way
of thinking about and balancing the respective roles,
responsibilities, and other legal touchstones where machine
learning models rest within direct human control, machine
control, or within the control of the blended human-machine
enterprise.
Information theory, competing schools of algorithm
design, and other disciplines each create deep and nuanced
differences in the varied designs and instantiations of
128. The August 2020 submission draft of this Article suggested that a risk
matrix model may integrate the ADS-ADSS and the static-dynamic taxonomies,
being diagrammed with the lowest risk quadrant occupied by static ADSS and
the highest risk quadrant by dynamic ADS.
129. See, e.g., Thomas Burri & Fredrik von Bothmer, The New EU Legislation
on Artificial Intelligence: A Primer (Apr. 21, 2021) (unpublished manuscript at 2–
3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3831424 (discussing bans, with some exceptions, on
real-time facial recognition and other high-risk AI proposed in Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down
Harmonized Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and
Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021));
see also Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act, A.B. 13, Reg. Sess.
§ 12115(b)(1), (3) (Cal. 2021) (high-risk ADS applications).
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machine learning systems. 130 As a result, there are
numerous types of machine learning systems, which, in turn,
may employ differing models of learning even within type. 131
This Article avoids those elephant weeds for now.
Machine learning has been synonymized as “automatic
learning,” which is defined as the “process by which a
functional unit improves its performance by acquiring new
knowledge or skills, or by reorganizing existing knowledge or
skills.” 132 Continuing, a machine learning system has the
ability “to automatically learn and improve from
experience,” 133 that experience being iterative exposures to
data, new or updated training datasets, and its own results
over time “without being explicitly programmed” for that
learning and improvement. 134
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) describes this automatic learning capacity as a
machine learning system’s ability to “distill[] meaning”
through its exposure to data. 135 Through this distillation, the
130. See, e.g., Laura Martignon, Information Theory, in INT’L ENCYC. OF THE
SOC. & BEHAV. SCIS. 7476, 7476–80 (2001); ED FINN, WHAT ALGORITHMS WANT:
IMAGINATION IN THE AGE OF COMPUTING 15–56 (2018); NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST
FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 398–425,
515–35 (2010); see also infra text accompanying notes 140, 253.
131. The field of AI is overrun with the word “learning” used with varying
modifiers. See, e.g., NILSSON, supra note 130, at 398–425 (categories of machine
learning); Mariusz Bojarski et al., End to End Learning for Self-driving Cars,
ARXIV 2 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1604.07316.pdf; ISO/IEC 2382:2015,
supra note 105 (Entry No. 2123770, genetic learning); HASTIE ET AL., supra note
94, at 605, 622–24 (ensemble learning); NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE
NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC
PLAN 24 (2016), https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf
(active learning); LUCCI & KOPEC, supra note 59, at 300 (reinforcement learning).
132. INTL. ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INTL. ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM.’N,
ISO/IEC 2382:2015, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY – VOCABULARY § 1,
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui#iso:std:iso-iec:2382:ed-1:v1:en (last visited Dec. 8,
2021) (Entry No. 2123789).
133. ISO 20252:2019, supra note 124 (Entry No. 3.52).
134. Id.; see Communications with Shivam Rai, Data and AI Lead, Cloudreach
(Aug. 11, 2020) (on file with author) (discussing training datasets).
135. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. LEADERSHIP
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machine learning system accumulates and refines its
“understanding” of its decisional domain. It distills the
correlations and other patterns among features within its
input data and the weights to which it assigns to those
patterns and features and, therefore, their significances
within that domain. Using the technical vernacular, the
system is trained or is self-training and thereby “learns” one
or more of its functions. 136
Capacities for degrees of real or apparent autonomy are
inherent in machine learning systems’ design and operation.
Such autonomy arises through the systems’ iterative
application of inductive bias and other decisional logics
seeking to optimize the correlations underlying their
computational results. Speech recognition, spam detection
systems, 137 internet searches that automatically formulate
and offer to complete search query commands and other
predictive text systems, and financial technology, or
FinTech, predictive systems 138 exemplify such machine
learning systems.
1. An Exemplar Machine Learning System in
Operation
Studying patents for machine learning and other
artificial intelligence inventions is a useful way to get a sense
of how such systems operate. For example, U.S. Patent No.
5,361,201 (the “‘201 patent”) claimed a machine learning
AI: PLAN OUTLINES PRIORITIES FOR FEDERAL AGENCY ENGAGEMENT IN AI
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 7 (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/system
/files/documents/2019/08/10/ai_standards_fedengagement_plan_9aug2019.pdf.
IN

136. See LUCCI & KOPEC, supra note 59, at 300.
137. See INT’L. ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 19731:2017, DIGITAL ANALYTICS
WEB ANALYSES FOR PURPOSES OF MARKET, OPINION AND SOCIAL RESEARCH –
VOCABULARY AND SERVICE REQUIREMENTS , https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std
:iso:19731:ed-1:v1:en (last visited Dec. 8, 2021) (Entry No. 3.22); ISO 20252:2019,
supra note 124 (Entry No. 3.52).

AND

138. See Bruckner, supra note 112, at 7–11, 16; see also, e.g., Willem Van de
Wiele, European FinTech: New Rules on the Way, 37 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y
REP., May 2018, at 16, 19, 21–23 (Financial Stability Board’s study of AI
implications for financial stability).
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invention using predictive modeling to automate real
property appraisals. 139 As with all U.S. patents, the patent
must disclose the preferred embodiment of the claimed
invention. 140 The claims of the ‘201 patent disclose that the
subject machine learning system best operates through the
following excerpted sequence of steps:
1. Training data are collected, including in a layered
collection process by which first one category of data,
e.g., geographic data, are collected followed by other
categories, e.g., property valuation data within a
selected geographic area; 141
2. Iterative sub steps are performed to: (a) apply live
input data to a predictive model, thereby generating
output data; (b) apply one or more quality or other
ranking measurements to those output data; and (c)
adjust, or “tune,” the model’s operation in response to
the ranking results; 142
3. A predictive model is developed based upon the
training data;
4. The selected predictive model is stored;
5. Live data for use in producing the desired AI system
outcome are obtained with each live data record
being comprised of multiple data elements, e.g.,

139. Real Est. Appraisal Using Predictive Modeling, U.S. Patent No. 5,361,201
(issued Nov. 1, 1994) [hereinafter ’201 patent]; see id. at claims 4, 8, 13, 16, 20
(“neural network”); see id. at abstract, summary (“neural network” or other
predictive models); Corelogic Info. Sols., Inc. v. Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-132RSP, 2012 WL 4355394, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2012) (construing “training
data” in ’201 patent).
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); see also, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248,
1253 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
141. See ’201 patent, supra note 139, at claim 9.2.
142. Stacey Ronaghan, Toward Demystifying Model Training & Tuning,
TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com
/demystifying-model-training-tuning-f4e6b46e7307; see ’201 patent, supra note
139, at claim 7. More precisely, model tuning is the optimization of the model’s
hyper-parameters or “hyper-parameter optimization.” Ronaghan, supra.
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property street address, parcel number, valuation
date; 143
6. An intermediate result, or “signal,” indicative of that
desired outcome is generated by applying the live
data to the stored predictive model; 144 and
7. For each data element within the live data, a value,
associated coding, and a sub-intermediate result are
generated by which to quantify and denote the
relative contribution of each element to the
intermediate result; 145
8. One or more error models, which may be an error
range or lower and upper percentile error values, for
example, is developed from the training data; 146
9. The selected error model(s) is(are) stored; and
10. An error result, or, again, “signal,” in the form of the
associated error model(s) is generated for the
intermediate result by applying the live data to the
stored error model(s). 147
Because patent law dictates that inventions be novel,
neither the ‘201 patent nor the AI process steps outlined here
are definitive for how all machine learning systems work.
Nevertheless, the operative steps disclosed in this patent
serve as a useful exemplar by which to illuminate those
workings generally.

143. See ’201 patent, supra note 139, at claim 14.
144. E.g., id. at claim 1.
145. See id. at claim 14.
146. See id. at claims 1, 3.
147. In addition to the sources cited interstitially, see id. at claims 1, 3, 7, 9,
12, 14.

1432

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

2. Models of Machine Learning
A machine learning system learns a function by an
iterative process of feedback and decisional enhancement. 148
Two common models of machine learning are supervised
learning and unsupervised learning. As their monikers
respectively suggest, these models involve humans or they
do not, or only scantily do, involve humans in the system’s
learning processes.
Under supervised learning models, the “learner,” i.e., the
machine learning system being trained, is exposed to paired
sets of input data, or “variables,” and output data, or
“outcomes.” 149 Generally, but not always, humans preinterpret and label these as input and output. 150 Stated
sparsely, these human trainers instruct the learner that “if
input is A, then outcome is B.” Through this intensive
process, 151 the system through its algorithmic and
statistically grounded logic “learns” the mapping function by
which, for a given set of input data and features within those
data, its corresponding output is to be returned. 152 The
148. See LUCCI & KOPEC, supra note 59, at 300.
149. See Saghar Sukla, Regression and Classification: Supervised Machine
https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/regressionLearning,
GEEKSFORGEEKS,
classification-supervised-machine-learning/ (June 1, 2021); Types of Artificial
Intelligence Algorithms You Should Know (A Complete Guide), UPGRAD BLOG
(Nov. 13, 2019) [hereinafter AI Algorithms Guide], https://www.upgrad.com/blog
/types-of-artificial-intelligence-algorithms/ (variables).
150. See Human Labeling, GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/vision
/automl/docs/human-labeling (last visited Nov. 16, 2020); Josh Taylor, No Labels?
No Problem!, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://towardsdatascience
.com/no-labels-no-problem-30024984681d.
151. For example, the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation created an
artificial intelligence analytics system for its millions of legal contracts across
fifty-four entities. See Roman Regelman, How We are “Digitizing This Very Bank”
at BNY Mellon, BNY MELLON: NEWSROOM (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.bnymellon
.com/us/en/newsroom/news/expert-voices/true-digital-artificial-intelligence-plushuman-intelligence.jsp; Communication with Kyle Johnson, Vice President, BNY
Mellon (Sept. 19, 2019) (on file with author). Some 150 attorneys worked to train
the system and validate its feature extractions. See id.
152. See Sukla, supra note 149; AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149
(variables).
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machine learns to connect the two concepts, i.e., input and
outcome, including by induction: the principle for and means
of “establishing [] universal statements by a consideration of
particular cases falling under them.” 153 Restated and
contextualized, the machine learning system computes and
“learns” the general rule(s) or finds patterns for correlating
inputs to outcomes as the result of repeated exposures to
associations between those elements. 154
Once a supervised machine learning system has been
trained, the system’s performance is evaluated against
previously unexposed input data, or so-called “testing data.”
Testing of that performance should occur and be
satisfactorily completed and validated prior to the live
deployment of the system. 155
Under unsupervised models of learning, machine
learning systems computationally derive, that is, “learn” or
“find,” optimized correlative statistical models by being
exposed to vast quantities of unlabeled or otherwise
uncategorized input data. 156 Humans are not or are only
minimally involved in these systems’ learning. As they also
are with supervised learning, the resultant models are
highly complex and characterized by potentially millions of
features within the input data. 157 For example, a machine
153. JOHN PATRICK DAY, INDUCTIVE PROBABILITY 3 (1961) (discussing
Aristotelian origins of inductive reasoning).
154. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 41, at 6; Marvin L. Minsky, Proposal
for Research by M. L. Minsky, in DARTMOUTH PROJECT, supra note 104, at 6
(Minsky’s pioneering machine learning proposal); see also Richa Bhatia,
Understanding the Difference Between Symbolic AI & Non Symbolic AI,
ANALYTICS INDIAN MAG. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://analyticsindiamag.com
/understanding-difference-symbolic-ai-non-symbolic-ai/ (discussing these AI
design theories as relevant to whether machine learning occurs pursuant to
learning rules or finding patterns).
155. See Nantasenamat, supra note 124.
156. See Khanum et al., supra note 40, at 34; Ocean Tomo, LLC v.
PatentRatings, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d 915, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (summarizing
expert testimony as to unsupervised machine learning).
157. See Khanum et al., supra note 40, at 34–35 (“massively parallel” resources
and methods); Firesmith, supra note 40.
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learning system in a DARPA-originated autonomous vehicle
project was able to detect, on its own, important road outlines
and other features where there was no human involvement
in its training beyond a mere 100 hours of steering the
vehicle on roadways. 158
For machine learning systems, there is an iterative or
periodic process by which the system is “tuned.” 159 These
tuning adjustments drive toward the selection of an
optimized model for the subject system’s operations. The
twin objectives of the tuning process are to minimize error
rates while simultaneously narrowing the range of the types
of error types that occur during the system’s operation. 160
Machine learning tools are being developed to expedite and
otherwise improve the creation and operation of other
machine learning systems. For example, auto-machine
learning, or Auto-ML, a new subdiscipline, is focused on
generating auto-tuning systems in which machine learning
tools are used to evaluate thousands of potential models in
tandem and then to select and optimize the selected
model. 161
As with other aspects of artificial intelligence, access to
tuning information can result in contentious discovery
proceedings. 162 Particularly where Auto-ML is employed,

158. Bojarski, supra note 131, at 1. DARPA is the acronym for the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency.
159. See MIT Lab. for Info. & Decision Sys’s, Auto-Tuning Data Science: New
Research Streamlines Machine Learning, MIT NEWS (Dec. 19, 2017) [hereinafter
MIT, Auto-Tuning], http://news.mit.edu/2017/auto-tuning-data-science-newresearch-streamlines-machine-learning-1219.
160. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 67, at 119–21.
161. See, e.g., MIT, Auto-Tuning, supra note 159.
162. See, e.g., Def.’s 702 Motion to Strike Aaron DeShaw, Esq., & Mark
Romano at 2–3, Schreiner v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., No. 2014cv-31147, 2015 WL 9901600 (D. Colo. Oct. 13, 2015) (tuning information for
Colossus, Allstate’s AI system for claims evaluation and valuation); see also Dawn
R. Bonnett, Note, Use of Colossus to Measure the General Damages of a Personal
Injury Claim Demonstrates Good Faith Claims Handling, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
107, 110–14 (2005) (describing Colossus system).
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other challenges will be to interpret the information, even if
such information were disclosed.
It is helpful to think of supervised and unsupervised
models of machine learning as sitting at opposite ends of a
spectrum that reflects the comparative degrees of human
involvement, if any, in training these systems. Human-only
mediated training that results in the system’s learning sits
at one end, and machine-only mediated learning, that is,
“self-” training, at the other. 163
Consider a scenario in which an individual alleges
reputational damage caused by a social media platform’s
machine learning-generated reputational score. 164 Among
other considerations, the analysis of whether and to what
extent the platform purveyor bears liability under a given
tort theory should consider whether the learning model was
mediated by humans and, if so, to what comparative degree
vis-à-vis machine mediation. If the learning model were
executed with machine-only mediation and, moreover, if the
resultant model finding were unknown, uninterpretable, or
unexplained, the liability analysis would require a
potentially different theoretical trajectory. Agency theory,
for example, provides a useful construct for evaluating
liability caused by an autonomous system, such as in an
unsupervised machine learning context. 165

163. See, e.g., Gomes et al., supra note 27, at 58, 60 fig. 4 (semi-supervised
learning model).
164. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 49, at 24–27; Abbey Stemler,
Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the Self-Regulation of the Sharing
Economy, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 673, 712 (2017).
165. See generally CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 115. “Agency” is a term of art
in law and in computer science and AI. See LUCCI & KOPEC, supra note 59, at 300.
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IV. THE ELEPHANT AS PROCESS: AI INPUTS
The Article earlier sketched out a mental map for the
legal conceptualization of AI as a process-based humanmachine enterprise. This Section focuses on the first part of
that AI taxonomy dealing with the inanimate inputs to AI
systems. As to the first AI input, it discusses data generally,
some key types of data, the critical processes by which data
curation occurs, and how databases and data systems are
designed. This Section also discusses data as used in
machine learning. It then turns to the second input:
statistics, statistical models, and model-related activities. As
the third input, the Article discusses algorithms, what they
are, and the three most common types of machine learning
algorithms.
A. Data, Big Data, and More and Different Data
Data are the lifeblood of AI, AI systems, and AI-mediated
processes. As a foundational note, all data are backwardlooking, 166 that is, they were captured in or synthesized from
data captured in the past. Any future-looking analyses
computed upon historical data are necessarily predictive and
based upon probabilities, rather than causal relationships or
determinative facts.
AI input data range from AI subject- or end usersupplied data to metadata to synthesized data, for
example. 167 All these implicate corresponding data sourcing,
166. See Caryn Devins et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 357, 360 (2017).
167. See Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan.
2005) (Metadata are “information about a particular data set which describes
how, when and by whom it was collected, created, accessed, or modified and how
it is formatted (including data demographics such as size, location, storage
requirements and media information”) (quoting SEDONA CONF., THE SEDONA
GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING
INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE app’x F (2005)); Don Libes,
David J. Lechevalier & Sanjay Jain, Issues in Synthetic Data Generation for
Advanced Manufacturing 1 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication
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preparation, and other data curation processes. Data may be
collected, such as by questionnaires or online forms, for
immediate and one-time algorithmic use. 168 They also may
be sourced at scale for propagating use through what Apple
CEO Tim Cook has warningly called the “data industrial
complex.” 169
1. What Are Data?
In
its
simplest
construction,
“data”
means
170
That synonymization, however, is
“information.”
insufficient to supply the context and perspectives needed for

/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=921398 (“[D]ata analytics applications can use synthetic
data to test that training algorithms perform adequately. Factories can also use
the data to experiment with proposed changes.”) (2017 IEEE Big Data
Conference, Boston, Mass., Dec. 11-14, 2017). Regarding synthetic data, see infra
text accompanying notes 227–32.
168. See, e.g., supra text accompanying nn.119–23 (regarding SAVRY rating
form).
169. Natasha Lomas, Apple’s Tim Cook Makes Blistering Attack on the ‘Data
Industrial Complex’, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018
/10/24/apples-tim-cook-makes-blistering-attack-on-the-data-industrial-complex/
(quoting Tim Cook, CEO, Apple, Inc.); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA
BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 19 (2014) [hereinafter
FTC, DATA BROKERS], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf; Giridhari Venkatadri et al., Privacy Risks
with Facebook’s PII-Based Targeting: Auditing a Data Broker’s Advertising
Interface, 2018 IEEE SYMP. ON SEC. AND PRIV. 89 (2018), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org
/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8418598 (discussing data brokers’ revenue
model based on aggregating information about individuals from numerous public
and private sources).
170. Pinpoint Inc. v. Amazon.com, No. 03-CV-4954, 2004 WL 5681471, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2004); see also, e.g., Kroll Ontrack, LLC v. Comm’r of Revenue,
931 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. 2019) (data are “detailed information of any kind”);
Keezer v. Spickard, 493 N.W.2d 614, 617–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring
recordation to meet “government data” definition); Servais v. Port of Bellingham,
904 P.2d 1124, 1130 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (rejecting lower court’s construction
of “research data” as “scientific facts” and holding same as “body of facts and
information collected for a specific purpose and derived from close, careful study,
or from scholarly or scientific investigation or inquiry”); RGIS Inventory
Specialists v. Palmer, 544 S.E.2d 79, 87 (W. Va. 2001) (tax exemption “data”
definition).
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AI. 171 A better working definition for data might be
representational, symbolic, or abstract information, which,
once recorded, may be digitally transmitted 172 or
transformed into other such information. 173
Data are organized within relational or, less frequently,
hierarchical databases. 174 That said, there is a hierarchical
structure to the way data are stored in those databases. 175
For present purposes, a data element is the smallest
informational item. 176 “Doe” might be the information
contained in one such data element, surname. Data elements
about one particular person or transaction, say, are collected
into a data record. 177 Thus, data elements for date of birth,
first name, and surname, for example, may be gathered into
a data record about the identity of a person, John Doe.
Continuing up the hierarchy, a dataset is a collection of
personal identification records for multiple people. 178 This
dataset aggregated or otherwise gathered together with
171. Context is key for determining the meaning of “data,” which may have
“such a wide range of meanings, in different contexts, that reliance on a specific
dictionary definition is not much help in answering the questions before us.”
RGIS Inventory Specialists, 544 S.E.2d at 85.
172. See Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601
(D. Del. 2004).
173. See RGIS Inventory Specialists, 544 S.E.2d at 85–86; see also Skinner v.
State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (employing a dictionary
definition to “data” as “factual information (as measurements or statistics) used
as a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation.” (internal citation omitted)).
174. See generally Lithmee, What Is the Difference Between Relational and
Hierarchical Database, PEDIAA (Oct. 30, 2018), https://pediaa.com/what-is-thedifference-between-relational-and-hierarchical-database/.
175. Communication with Donald L. Simon, Professor, Mathematics &
Comput. Sci. Dep’t, Duquesne Univ. (Aug. 14, 2020) (on file with author).
176. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., BIG DATA INTEROPERABILITY
FRAMEWORK: VOLUME 2, TAXONOMIES § 3.1, at 26–27, 26 fig. 10 (2018) [hereinafter
NIST BIG DATA TAXONOMIES], https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Special
Publications/NIST.SP.1500-2r2.pdf; see also PersonalWeb Tech., LLC v. NEC
Corp. of Am., No. 6:11-CV-655, 2013 WL 4015332, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013)
(Markman order construing “data item” as “sequence of bits”).
177. See NIST BIG DATA TAXONOMIES, supra note 176, § 3.2, at 27.
178. See id. § 3.3, at 28.
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other datasets, for example, about the credit experiences of
those people, their healthcare treatments and visits, and
others. 179
2. What Is “Big Data”?
Data are big—astronomically big. Every year, 175
zettabytes of data are produced, consumed, and stored. 180
Check that number: 175 followed by 21 zeroes, i.e.,
175,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes of data every year. 181
For perspective, 175 zettabytes occupies many multiples of
millions of times more storage than would all the documents
held by the U.S. Library of Congress, 182 the largest library in
the world with more than 170 million items in its
collections. 183 The John Deere Company processes more data
than Twitter. 184 The agricultural giant, one of the largest
users of cloud computing in the world, gathers up to 15
million measurement readings per second from a global
network of some 130,000 machines. 185 That is big data and
the rocket fuel driving the percussive explosion of AI around
the world.
Big data describes the vast “deluge of data in today’s
networked, digitized, sensor-laden, and information-driven
world.” 186 Many provably hard problems confound
traditional analytical methods and resources. Provably hard
179. See id. § 3.4, at 28.
180. José M.F. Moura, IEEE President’s Column: An IEEE for the Next
Technological Revolution, IEEE SPECTRUM: THE INSTITUTE (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/ieee-presidents-column-an-ieee-for-the-nexttechnological-revolution (IEEE President and CEO).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Fascinating Facts, U.S. LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/about
/fascinating-facts/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
184. See Tekla S. Perry, John Deere’s Quest to Solve Agriculture’s DeepLearning Problems, 57 IEEE SPECTRUM, Feb. 2020, at 4.
185. Id.
186. NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 1.1, at 2.
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problems are those that are solvable in theory, but not as a
practical matter because their scope and complexity outstrip
computational methods and resources. Big data, along with
advances in computational performance and design,
represent the potential to such previously practicably
unanswerable questions, such as, presciently in view of the
COVID-19 crisis, “How can a potential pandemic reliably be
detected early enough to intervene?” 187
The quantity, or volume, of big data is only one
characteristic of these extensive datasets, however. An
alliterative list summarizes big data’s principal
characteristics: volume, variety, velocity, variability,
veracity, validity, volatility, and value. 188 These
187. Id.
188. Volume refers to the size of the subject dataset. See id. § 2, at 6; id.
§ 3.2.1, at 10.
Variety refers to the characteristic of the data within the subject datasets as
arising from multiple database sources and being of varying types, data
structures, domains, and other characteristics. See id. § 2, at 6; id. § 3.2.3, at 10;
id. § 3.3.1, at 11.
Velocity refers to the rates at which the data flow into and within the
computational systems. See id. § 2, at 6; id. § 3.2.2, at 10. Compare id., with PETE
GUERRA ET AL., BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, THE FIELD GUIDE TO DATA SCIENCE 55 (2d
ed., 2015) [hereinafter BAH, DATA SCIENCE], http://www.boozallen.com/insights
/2015/12/data-science-field-guide-second-edition (using “data rate” as synonym
for data velocity, but more broadly scoped to include rate at which data are
created, gathered, and processed, data rate as significant influencer).
Variability refers to changes within the subject datasets that, in turn, impact
upon the applications using those datasets. Those changes may include, for
example, variability in data velocity, their format or structure, semantics, or
quality. See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 2, at 6; id. § 3.2.4, at
10.
Veracity refers to the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of the data. See
id. § 2, at 6; id. § 5.4.1, at 26; BAH, DATA SCIENCE, supra, at 94 (discussing data
veracity and subjective and other means to ascertain same).
Validity means the appropriateness of the subject data for its intended purpose.
See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 2, at 6; id. § 5.4.2, at 26. But
cf. id. § 5.1, at 22–23 (data mining or knowledge discovery as uses beyond
prospectively intended data analytics purpose).
Volatility means the degree to which the data structures tend to change over
time. See id. § 2, at 6; id. § 5.4.3, at 26.
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characteristics do or may have legal significance, as
recognized by the courts. 189 Scholars likewise are
increasingly investigating these characteristics of big data,
and its impacts generally. 190
Due to some or all of its “V” characteristics and their
interactions, 191 big data far outstrips the capabilities and
Value signifies the economic, social, or other wealth represented by or resident
within the subject dataset. See id. § 2, at 6; id. § 5.4.5, at 27. Note that not all of
the foregoing characteristics may or must be present in all datasets that are
considered “big data.” For example, data operating with the Internet of Things
might be of relatively small volume, but the velocity with which the data
transmission and processing must occur could nevertheless qualify the small
subject dataset as big data. See id. § 3.2.2, at 10; id. § 4.3.3, at 20. Although the
V-alliterative mental model is useful, other characteristics long associated with
data analytics, e.g., completeness, comprehensiveness, and others, continue to be
relevant in big data applications and likely also for legal inquiry. See id. § 5.4.7,
at 28.
189. See, e.g., LSSI Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone, LLC, 696 F.3d 1114, 1117
(11th Cir. 2012) (“This customer data has a number of uses, so it is valuable.”).
190. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation
While Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 1413, 1417–18 (2014); Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against
Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1223–28 (2018);
John Frank Weaver, Artificial Intelligence and Governing the Life Cycle of
Personal Data, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 2018, at 1, 2–18; see also Margaret
Hu, From the National Surveillance State to the Cybersurveillance State, 13 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 162–63 (2017); Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and
Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53
(2017); Yoni Har Carmel & Tammey Harel Ben-Shahar, Reshaping Ability
Grouping Through Big Data, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 109 (2017); Timothy
M. Snyder, Note, You’re Fired! A Case for Agency Moderation of Machine Data in
the Employment Context, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 254–56 (2016); GLENN J.
VOELZ, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL., THE RISE OF IWAR: IDENTITY, INFORMATION, AND THE
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF MODERN WARFARE 89, 109–20 (2015), https://ntrl.ntis.gov
/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/ADA624745.xhtml
(government
military and surveillance use of AI with data from non-contact mass collection
and compilation of facial images and behavioral and other biometrics). See
generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, “Equality and Privacy by
Design”: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency via Auditing,
Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428 (2019)
(concise helpful treatment of data and its role in AI and machine learning).
191. Compare NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 3.1, at 8
(scalability requirements as driven by only four V-named characteristics), with
id. § 3.1, at 9, and id. § 3.2, at 10 (all V-named characteristics as potential
scalability requirement drivers).
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capacities of traditional computational approaches. 192
Instead, they necessitate scalable architectures that can
efficiently and cost-effectively store, manipulate, and
analyze these data. 193 It is this extensiveness and scale that
distinguish big data from “small data,” the latter being
datasets that are sufficiently circumscribed or presented
through visualizations so that humans can understand and
evaluate them. 194
Data elements within any dataset possess another
characteristic, that being the presence and some varying
degrees of complexity between those elements. 195 These
interchanging complexities gave rise to a large international,
multi-stakeholder effort convened by the NIST to establish a
reference architecture for software, extensive supporting
materials, and other tools to better facilitate the use and
transmission of data agnostically across computing
192. See NIST BIG DATA TAXONOMIES, supra note 176, § 1.1, at 7.
193. See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 2, at 6; see also
Computer Science: Architecture & Organization, BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/science/computer-science/Architecture-and-organization
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2021); ANTHONY SNEED & MANUEL FRADINHO OLIVEIRA,
NETWORKED GRAPHICS: BUILDING NETWORKS GAMES AND VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
393–458 (2010) (scalability chapter); NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109,
§ 3.1, at 9; id. § 4.3.1, at 18 (scalability, including horizontal and vertical
scalability); id. § 2, at 6 (latency); id. § 4.3.1, at 18 (high performance computing,
including massively parallel processing).
194. See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 2, at 7 (“small data”);
id. § 5.4.4, at 27. The visualization of complex weather data for visualization on
a map is an example of small data. See The Weather Company, Round-the-clock
Accurate Weather Reports Help VTV Keep Citizens Informed, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/weather/industries/broadcast-media (last visited Dec. 3,
2021) (The Weather Company Advantage video). “Small data” is also a shorthand
term denoting small data sets, a usage not to be confused with the data
visualization and human cognition concepts discussed here. See, e.g., Karen Hao,
A Radical New Technique Lets AI Learn with Practically No Data, MIT TECH REV.
(Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/16/1010566/aimachine-learning-with-tiny-data/.
195. See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, § 5.4.7, at 28; see also,
e.g., Jamie Pamela Rasmussen, Horseless Carriages with Buggy-whip Holders:
The Failure of Legal Citation Reform in the 1990s, 110 LAW LIBR. J. 221, 222, 229
(2018) (court opinions increasingly incorporating images, tables, diagrams, video
files, and other non-textual content).

2021]

AI, ON THE LAW OF THE ELEPHANT

1443

platforms, these being useful to understanding data in AI
terms. 196
3. What Is Data Curation?
Big data brings with it dynamic, widely sourced,
structured, and unstructured data of varying quality,
formats, provenance, and dates of capture, 197 and repeated
data changes over time. 198 Data curation creates order from
this chaos. Without the rigor of data curation and its
painstaking organizing and transformative processes, data
would remain an “archipelago of information” with its great
potential utility and value locked inside and difficult, if not
impossible, to reach. 199 For these and other reasons, data
curation can be distinguished, but not decoupled from the AI
process.
Many AI data curation processes are human-intensive
with multiple decision points throughout. 200 Automated data
curation tools, themselves machine learning-based, are also
increasingly being developed and deployed to achieve greater
efficiencies and economies of scale than can be achieved with
human-only data curation. 201 Thus, data curation is
becoming, like AI, a blended human-machine enterprise.
Views differ as to the scope of activities and processes
196. See NIST Final ‘Big Data’ Framework Will Help Make Sense of Our DataDrenched Age, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www
.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/10/nist-final-big-data-framework-will-helpmake-sense-our-data-drenched-age.
197. See A.M. Turing Award Laureate Michael Stonebraker, Lecture on
Tackling the Challenges of Big Data 9–18 (2019) (on file with author) (lecture
transcript from 2019 graduate data science course).
198. See Michael Dumiak, Data Project Aims to Organize Scientific Records, 57
IEEE SPECTRUM, Mar. 2020, at 9.
199. Id. at 10; MIT, Auto-Tuning, supra note 159 (complex series).
200. See Francesca Rossi, IBM A.I. Glob. Ethics Leader, Remarks at the Nat’l
Inst. of Standards and Tech., Exploring AI Trustworthiness Kickoff Webinar
(Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2020/08/exploring-aitrustworthiness-workshop-series-kickoff-webinar.
201. See, e.g., MIT, Auto-Tuning, supra note 159.
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within the data curation wheelhouse. 202 This Section
introduces data curation from a holistic framing reference.
Minimally stated, data curation encompasses work involving
the “four A’s of data”: architecture, including database
design; acquisition and other pre-analysis data preparations;
analysis; and archiving. 203
A University of Edinburgh’s Digital Curation Centre
collaboration, however, fields a more detailed data curation
lifecycle model. 204 Contextualized here for AI, the model’s
sequential activities are to: (1) conceptualize the data
system, including its architecture design and data modeling;
(2) discover and source the data 205 and create associated
metadata 206 and other attributional data; (3) appraise,
including as to the data’s virtuousness, provenance,
accuracy, and other quality and potentially compliance
202. Professor Stonebraker and colleagues consider data curation processes to
encompass from data sourcing through final pre-analysis data preparations. See
Michael Stonebraker et al., Data Curation at Scale: The Data Tamer, Remarks
at the 6th Biennial Conf. on Innovative Data Sys. Rsch. 1, in Asilomar, Cal. (Jan.
6–9, 2013); see also Michelle Cheatham & Catia Pesquita, Semantic Data
Integration, in HANDBOOK ON BIG DATA TECHNOLOGIES 263, 264 (Sherif Sakr &
Albert Zomaya eds., 2017) (ebook), https://daselab.cs.ksu.edu/sites/default/files
/semantic-data-integration.pdf.
Others, however, use data curation to collectively refer to four groups of processes
going beyond analysis and through to the point of archival, as follows: (1) work
regarding database design and other data architecture; (2) data acquisition and
cleaning and other processing preparatory to (3) data analysis; and (4) data
archival, or “the four A’s of data,” i.e., architecture, acquisition, analysis, and
archiving. JEFFREY S. SALTZ & JEFFREY M. STANTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO DATA
SCIENCE 2 (2018).
203. SALTZ & STANTON, supra note 202, at 2.
204. See Sarah Higgins, The DCC Curation Lifecycle Model, 3 INT’L J. DATA
CURATION 134, 135–36 (2008); see also UNIV. OF EDINBURGH DIGIT. CURATION CTR.,
Curation Lifecycle Model, https://www.dcc.ac.uk/guidance/curation-lifecyclemodel (last visited Dec. 8, 2021) (excellent model visualization); UNIV. OF
EDINBURGH DIGIT. CURATION CTR., Introduction to Curation, https://www.dcc.ac
.uk/guidance/briefing-papers/introduction-curation (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
205. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2018) (housing
discrimination allegedly caused by automated algorithmic decision-making).
206. See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646–47 (D.
Kan. 2005) (detailed discussion of metadata).
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indicia, 207 and select the data; (4) clean, including to deduplicate, 208 complete, and otherwise transform the data
and, from those, create new data; (5) deploy the data in
distributed stores across multicore parallel processing and
other computational resources for greater efficiency, privacy,
and security, for example; 209 (6) ingest the data, meaning to
expose the subject AI system to and perform computations
upon the data; (7) preserve the data, including as required
under public records acts and for other archival purposes;
and (8) access, use, and reuse data for downstream AI
applications, for example. 210
These essential processes impact the quality, validity,
and trustworthiness of AI systems’ functioning and output
and are sure to raise significant legal considerations. 211

207. See generally, e.g., Madden et al., supra note 190 (examining and warning
that ubiquitous data collection and aggregation are expanding discrimination
against the poor and increased use of thus-enabled predictive analytics is
disproportionately eroding their privacy); Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web
Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372
(2018) (web scraping as automated data harvesting); Bruckner, supra note 112,
at 15 (quoting ZestFinance CEO, “All data is [sic] credit data”).
208. See Perry, supra note 184, at 4.
Much of this information [i.e., data processed by John Deere] is so-called
dirty data that doesn’t share the same format or structure because it’s
coming from some 100 other companies that have access to the John Deere
platform, in addition to the wide variety of John Deere machines. Those
companies add data about weather conditions, aerial imagery, soil
analyses, and so on. As a result, Deere has had to make tremendous
investments in back-end data cleanup.
Id. (emphases supplied).
209. See Higgins, supra note 204, at 136 fig. 1, 138 (data store action).
210. See id. at 138; Stonebraker et al., supra note 202, at 1.
211. See, e.g., Christine L. Borgman, Open Data, Grey Data, and Stewardship:
Universities at the Privacy Frontier, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 408–09 (2018)
(discussing rarity of researchers with legal expertise and short- and long-term
data curation resources).
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4. Mapping Data to Artificial Intelligence
Building upon this focus on data, this Section now
returns to the AI-as-process model and presents some major
data categories and perspectives mapping those categories to
that model. To somewhat stem the flood of data terms
running out of the elephant’s ears, this Section offers clarity
around some of those terms. First, it discusses data
structure, or lack thereof, examining what are structured,
unstructured, and semi-structured data. Second, it presents
another view of data, exploring three categories of data as
operative subjects of AI: real data, derived data, and
synthetic data, with a nod also to imputed data. Third, it
considers machine learning categories of testing and training
data.
a. Categories of Data Structure
First, unprocessed, or uncurated, data are called “raw
data.” 212 These data may be collected from various sources
and exist and are stored in various formats, but they need to
be processed before they can be of analytical value. 213 As
discussed, data curation imposes order and quality
requirements upon the dataset(s) to be amalgamated and
used by an AI system. In big data characteristics terms,
supra Section IV.A.2, raw data exhibit a high degree of
variety, if not also volatility and variability.
Second, data are “structured” when the information in
those data is clearly organized and easily searchable in
distinct fields, such as in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet cells or
in database or data table fields, and when those fields have
an express meaning, such as “eye color,” that is numeric,
ordinal, or otherwise categorical, such as “brown.” 214

212. See NIST BIG DATA DEFINITIONS, supra note 109, at 6.
213. See id.
214. See BAH, DATA SCIENCE, supra note 188, at 55; Christine Taylor,
Structured vs. Unstructured Data, DATAMATION (May 21, 2021), https://www
.datamation.com/big-data/structured-vs-unstructured-data.html.
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Unstructured data, however, are not initially organized in
such a clear and distinct manner. Viewed as data in natural
English language, and a Microsoft Word document format,
for example, the text of this Article would be categorized as
unstructured, as likewise are audio recordings, podcasts,
photographs, and videos. 215 To provide a sense of
comparative scale, about eighty percent of an organization’s
data may be unstructured. 216
The categorization of data as structured or unstructured
indicate the degree and complexity of preprocessing work
that must be done before pertinent features contained or
represented therein those data can be identified and made
available, or “extracted,” for analysis. 217 Generally,
unstructured
data
require
comparatively
more
preprocessing work than do structured data, and this
suggests a greater potential for the introduction of errors
into the data.
A third category of semi-structured data lies between the
two polar ends of these structural characterizations of data.
Semi-structured data are similar to unstructured data
because they likewise are not organized in distinct fields in
data tables. They are rendered similar to structured data,
however, by categorizing keywords, or “tags” or “labels,” or
other informational markers placed in association with those
data by human or algorithmic annotators. 218
215. See BAH, DATA SCIENCE, supra note 188, at 55.
216. See Michael Chen, Structured vs. Unstructured Data, ORACLE: BIG DATA
BLOG (Oct. 9, 2019), https://blogs.oracle.com/bigdata/structured-vs-unstructureddata.
217. See BAH, DATA SCIENCE, supra note 188, at 55.
218. “Tags” are metadata that are attached to the subject data to describe the
information within those data. See INFO. SHARING & ACCESS INTERAGENCY POL’Y
COMM. ET AL., PRIORITY OBJECTIVE 3: DATA TAGGING FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
1, 4 , 7–8 (2014), https://www.dni.gov/files/ISE/documents/DocumentLibrary/PO3
-Data-Tagging-Functional-Requirements.pdf; BAH, DATA SCIENCE, supra note
188, at 55; see also Amazon Introduces a New Way to Label Data for Machine
Learning with MTurk, AMAZON: MECHANICAL TURK (Dec. 13, 2018), https://blog
.mturk.com/aws-introduces-a-new-way-to-label-data-for-machine-learning-with-
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The structural category(ies) of data upon which AI
operates may have legal implications. For example, if an AI
system uses semi-structured or unstructured data as input,
then the accuracy and other characteristics of its
computational results are dependent upon the accuracy and
other quality measures of the associated tag placements or
other data preprocessing. The persons and processes used to
tag data may raise other legal issues. 219 Constitutionality,
evidentiary sufficiency, discriminatory bias, and compliance
with reasonableness standards are among the other legal
issues that may arise from the data used or the structures
existing as to or imposed upon those data. 220
b. Types of Data for Computation
This Section identifies three types of data used in AI
computations: real, derived, and synthetic data. Real data
means those data that are created by actual, as opposed to
computational, events. 221 Wind turbine actuator and sensor
data, analyzed by machine learning to detect faults that may
signal maintenance needs, are examples of real data. 222
Derived data are also created and used. Albeit somewhat
circularly, a United Nations commission defines a derived
mturk-2f9c19866a98.
219. See, e.g., Dhruv Mehrotra, Horror Stories from Inside Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, GIZMODO (Jan. 28, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/horror
-stories-from-inside-amazons-mechanical-turk-1840878041; Moshe Z. Marvit,
Amazon & Mechanical Turk: How Crowdworkers (the Low-wage Virtual Labor)
Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, EUR. SOLIDAIRE SANS FRONTIÈRES (Feb.
4, 2014), http://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article31067.
220. See, e.g., U.K. INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,
MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 44 (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf
(“[E]ven when the raw data used in the analysis is [sic] recorded accurately, there
may be issues as to how representative the dataset is and whether the analytics
contain hidden bias.”).
221. See Libes et al., supra note 167, at 1. Real data also may be called “live
data,” id., or “actual data,” FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 169, at 19.
222. See, e.g., Magda Ruiz et al., Wind Turbine Fault Detection and
Classification by Means of Image Texture Analysis, 107 MECH. SYS’S & SIGNAL
PROCESSING 149, 149–50 (2018).
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datum as a “data element derived from other data elements
using a mathematical, logical, or other type of
transformation, e.g.[,] arithmetic formula, composition,
aggregation, etc.” 223 By whatever means, derived data are
those that are inferred based upon the real data. 224 As an
example, your author’s surname, i.e., the real data, is of
Spanish origin. Therefore, the derived data that might be
inferred from this real data is that I am Latina/X/e, which is,
in my case, a correct inference. Inferred data may be
factually incorrect, however, such as if I had acquired my
surname by marriage and were actually of Lithuanian
heritage. Inferred data’s role in AI systems is important to
illuminate and question. For example, in the significantly
segregated landscape that is the United States, zip codes are
strongly correlated with race, and their use in AI systems
may constitute illegal proxies for race in AI-mediated
decision-making. 225
Data also may be synthesized. 226 Also called artificial,
virtual, imputed, simulated, or generated data, 227 synthetic
data may be generated de novo where, for example, real data
are in short supply and a larger corpus of training data is

223. See UNITED NATIONS STAT. COMM’N & ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR.,
TERMINOLOGY ON STATISTICAL METADATA 1, 11 (2000), http://www.unece.org
/fileadmin/DAM/stats/publications/53metadaterminology.pdf.
224. See FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 169, at 19; Paulina Gueorguieva,
Declared or Inferred Data and What It Means For Marketers?, ADSQUARE (Mar.
28, 2017), https://www.adsquare.com/declared-or-inferred-data-and-what-itmeans-for-marketers/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20210414165335/https://ww
w.adsquare.com/declared-or-inferred-data-and-what-it-means-for-marketers/].
225. See Oliver Rollins et al., Proxies for Race: A Catalogue, PRICE LAB FOR
DIGIT.
HUMANITIES,
https://pricelab.sas.upenn.edu/projects/proxies-racecatalogue (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
226. See Libes et al., supra note 167, at 1; Cem Dilmegani, The Ultimate Guide
to Synthetic Data in 2020, AI MULTIPLE , https://research.aimultiple.com
/synthetic-data/ (Aug. 9, 2021). In addition, data are created to fill in gaps in real
data. These new synthesized data are created by imputing them from the existing
data. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL. , supra note 94, at 332–33.
227. See Libes et al., supra note 167, at 1.
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needed. 228 One method by which this occurs is by “seeding”
synthetic data from a real data sample to augment an
inadequate supply of real data to, for example, use AI to help
diagnose rare diseases. 229 In other instances, a dataset may
combine synthetic and real data. 230 Some synthetic data may
be produced as intermediate outputs for other AI processes
or to lay down additional layers of privacy protection for the
data subjects. 231
Legal questions exist as to these categories of data used
in AI systems. For example, a patentability challenge may
turn, in part, upon whether a claim in the patent disclosed
the training use of real or synthetic data. 232 Evidentiary
issues also likely will arise as to the appropriateness of
reliance upon synthetic data. There may be claims
challenging the reasonableness of inferences made to
generate derived data or whether discrimination occurs
where inferences may be tied to racial stereotypes. Invasions
of privacy may result when marketing analytics systems
228. See Alexandre Gonfalonieri, Do You Need Synthetic Data for Your AI
Project?, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/doyou-need-synthetic-data-for-your-ai-project-e7ecc2072d6b; Evan Nisselson, Deep
Learning with Synthetic Data Will Democratize the Tech Industry, TECHCRUNCH
(May 11, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/11/deep-learning-withsynthetic-data-will-democratize-the-tech-industry/.
229. See SIMSON L. GARFINKEL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S.
DEP’T COMM., DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 52 (2015),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.pdf (glossary entry for
“synthetic data generation”); Computer Security Resource Center, Synthetic Data
Generation, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary
/term/synthetic_data_generation (last visited Dec. 8, 2021); see, e.g., Richard J.
Chen et al., Synthetic Data in Machine Learning for Medicine and Healthcare, 5
NATURE BIOMEDICAL ENG’G 493–97 (2021), https://www.nature.com/articles
/s41551-021-00751-8.pdf; Watson Health Perspectives, Bridging the Data-tostudy Gap to Solve Rare Disease Research Challenges, IBM (May 24, 2021),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson-health/bridging-the-data-to-study-gap-tosolve-rare-disease-research-challenges/.
230. See, e.g., Gonfalonieri, supra note 228.
231. See Steven M. Bellovin et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 30 (2019); GARFINKEL, supra note 229, § 2.2, at 6–8.
232. See Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Am. Vehicular Scis. LLC, No. IPR201400647, 2014 WL 5462676, at *5–28 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2014).
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infer a teenager’s not-yet-revealed pregnancy based upon her
purchases. 233
c. Data Categories in Machine Learning
The prior Section discussed types of data ingested by AI
systems to produce computational results. Before machine
learning systems are deployed, data may be grouped into
“training” and “testing” data categories during the creation
of those systems, specifically during the design and
development of supervised learning systems. It is important
to understand how training and testing data are assembled
and used during those and other stages of AI processes.
Recall the supervised model of machine learning
discussed supra in Section III.C.2. Under that model, the
learner is exposed to labelled input-output pairs so that the
correlations between the two may be discovered and its
statistical model accordingly built for the system’s later use
in the wild. When placed into operation, the system will be
exposed to previously unseen or unknown inputs and, based
upon its modeling, be expected to produce results that reflect
the modeled correlation. These initial input-output pairs
constitute the training data. 234
Once the machine learning system has been trained, its
computational decision-making is tested to determine
whether, when exposed to previously unseen input data, it
will return the proper predictive output based upon its
earlier training and the system’s intended purpose. 235 One
landmine to avoid, and one for lawyers and their experts to
detect, is the use of training data as testing data. That poor
practice predictably results in a falsely more favorable

233. See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant
Before her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnantbefore-her-father-did/#45c65ad66668.
234. See LUCCI & KOPEC, supra note 59, at 298.
235. See Sukla, supra note 149.
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estimate of the system’s performance. 236 Unfortunately, this
may occur to the peril of the courts, other AI users, and, most
perniciously and harmfully, the people who are the AI’s data
subjects. 237
B. Statistical Models and AI Modeling Processes
Courts have long analyzed and opined on matters
involving the rarified art of statistics. 238 For example, the
courts have parsed litigants’ proffered patent claim
constructions attempting to distinguish unsupervised
machine learning from regression modeling 239 and predictive
modeling from statistical modeling in a supervised learning
context. 240 Disparate impact discrimination cases and
criminal cases involving DNA evidence are other examples of
the courts’ extensive experience in splitting such elephant
236. This practice is even more suspect than a vendor’s self and close thirdparty validations of its AI-enabled DNA software purported to be able to
probabilistically predict the identities of contributors to mixed DNA samples. See
generally State v. Pickett, No. A-4207-19T4, 2021 WL 357765 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Feb. 3, 2021) (TrueAllele Casework system).
237. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 112, at 25–26.
238. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175–77 (D. Utah 2001)
(distinguishing statistical sampling from imputed data for census purposes),
aff’d, 536 U.S. 452 (2002); Cooper v. Univ. of Tex., 482 F. Supp. 187, 196–98 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (analyzing statistical sampling and standard deviations under chisquare test in sex discrimination case), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981); see
also, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494–99, (1977) (examining
“statistical disparities” over time as to Mexican Americans’ representation in
general population (79%) and grand juries (39%)); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494 n.11 (1954) (subsequent history omitted) (citing, in part, KENNETH B.
CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT
(1950)); Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identity and Preference in
Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOC. PSYCH. 169–78 (Theodore M. Newcomb &
Eugene L. Hartly eds., 1947) (reporting statistical, other quantitative, and
qualitative results of dolls test used in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. litigation). The
confidential 1950 report by Kenneth Clark is not readily available, but this 1947
study presents the statistical results of the famous dolls test.
239. See Ocean Tomo, LLC v. PatentRatings, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d 915, 956
(N.D. Ill. 2019).
240. See Corelogic Info. Sols., Inc. v. Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-132-RSP, 2012
WL 4355394, at *3–6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2012).
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hairs. Legal writers have also started examining statistics in
AI contexts. 241
Here, the Article describes what statistical models are
and how such models relate to AI in general and machine
learning in particular. It reviews the processes associated
with AI statistical modeling. The Section next sketches an
example of how judicial review of agencies’ decisions
regarding statistical modeling and AI design might require
additional inquiry to justify the courts’ deference to those
decisions. It concludes with a foreshadowing of an even
greater complexity driving the need for explainable AI.
1. What Is a Statistical Model?
The paramount and permanent feature of statistical
models is that “all models are approximations. Essentially,
all models are wrong, but some are useful. However, the
approximate nature of the model must always be borne in
mind.” 242 Because all models are wrong, lawyers “must be
alert to what is importantly wrong. It is inappropriate to be
concerned about mice when there are tigers abroad.” 243 Fix
that in an elephant’s memory. 244
In AI, statistics operate within statistical models that
are used to reflect relationships between features within the
input data and the output of the system. Numerous types
241. See generally, e.g., Brown, supra note 71 (describing, in rare detail,
statistical approaches incorporated within design of AI-based document review
and predictive coding systems); Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 67, at 1156–60;
Cassandra Jones Havard, “On the Take”: The Black Box of Credit Scoring and
Mortgage Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 241, 262–63 (2011) (touching
upon statistical underpinnings of machine learning).
242. GEORGE E. P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND
RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987) (emphasis supplied).
243. George E. P. Box, Science and Statistics, 71 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 791, 792
(1976). Dr. Box had “one of the greatest statistical minds of the 20th century.”
Ronald Wasserstein, George Box: A Model Statistician, 7 SIGNIFICANCE Sept. 2010
at 134, 134, https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2010
.00442.x.
244. See James Ritchie, Fact or Fiction?: Elephants Never Forget, SCI. AM. (Jan.
12, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/elephants-never-forget/.
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and variants of statistical models exist, and these models are
linked to and embodied in corresponding AI algorithms. For
this reason, this Article discusses those linked topics of
algorithms expressing statistical models in the next Section.
Here, the focus is on what a statistical model is and to briefly
introduce the steps of model building, determination, model
selection, and model finding.
Recall this Article’s operational categorization of AI as
static, that is, non-learning AI, and dynamic AI, that is,
generally, machine learning. Statistical models underlie
both categories of AI. 245 A statistical model, or “model,” is a
set of mathematical functions that approximately express
and, potentially, predict the relationship(s) of interest
between features within the input data and the output. 246
Where the prediction, for example, of criminal recidivism
risk is the objective for the AI’s use, the statistical model is
called a “predictive model” or “inferential model.” 247 Briefly,
predictive models work by accounting for the uncertainty
and randomness associated with the model’s observations of
the data features’ characteristics or behavior vis-à-vis the
output and then inferentially extending those observations
to further postulate the model’s description of that
characteristic or behavior. 248 In machine learning, the
predictive model iteratively operates upon the input data
and aims toward increasingly better optimization of that
245. See, e.g., Richard Cook, Statistical Modeling and Machine Learning
Coexist, Not Compete, CMSWIRE (July 24, 2019), https://www.cmswire.com
/digital-experience/statistical-modeling-and-machine-learning-coexist-notcompete/.
246. See HAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 1.5.1, at 23 (defining statistical model as
collection of “mathematical functions that describe the characteristics or behavior
of the objects in a target class in terms of random variables and their associated
probability distributions.”); HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, at 27–28; What Is
Statistical
Modeling?,
XLSTAT,
https://help.xlstat.com/s/article/what-isstatistical-modeling (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
247. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, at 333; HAN ET AL., supra note 43,
§ 1.5.1, at 24.
248. See HAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 1.5.1, at 24.
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model.
2. Model Building, Determination, Selection, and
Finding
Model building, determining, and selection are an
integrated and iterative process to developing a probabilistic
model that best describes mathematically the relationship
between the independent and dependent variables within
the system, these being its input and output, respectively,
either of which may be qualitative or quantitative. 249 Among
the major considerations during this process are to identify
the proper mathematical, or perhaps geometric, form of the
relationship between the two and the selection of which
independent variables to include and the weights, or
indicators of significance to the task at hand, to assign to
those variables. 250 The foregoing process is called “tuning,”
and model selection is its endpoint. 251 “Model finding” is a
term typically used to describe tuning as carried out
autonomously, or largely so, by machine learning systems.
The building, determination, and selection of a
contextually optimized model occurs for all artificial
intelligence systems during the final steps of system design.
In carrying out this work, data scientists and others on
system design teams must identify and choose, potentially
from among thousands, the modeling technique that is
expected to yield optimal performance in the subject system
and optimal results for the particular problem or use case to
which the system is directed. 252 The decisions made during
tuning are highly deliberated. 253 Depending upon the
numbers and complexity of potential models to be
249. See David R. Anderson, Dennis J. Sweeney & Thomas A. Williams, Model
Building, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/statistics/Residualanalysis#ref60719 (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
250. See id.
251. For a discussion of tuning, see supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
252. See MIT, Auto-Tuning, supra note 159.
253. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 67, at 120; Rossi, supra note 200.
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comparatively evaluated, the decisions may themselves be
facilitated and expedited by the use of machine learning
tools. 254
In such cases, transparency, the reasonableness of
reliance, and other legal questions harken back to humanmachine constructs discussed earlier in this Article. New
legal theories or new ideas for applying existing doctrine to
these unprecedented human-machine collaborations are
needed. For example, where government agencies employ AI
and other algorithmic means, their decisions as to the choices
of statistical model and datasets upon which those models
operate are subject to judicial review, but with significant
deference to the agencies’ discretion and particularly so for
“agency modeling of complex phenomena.” 255 Even an
agency’s reliance upon imperfect datasets or statistical
models will not necessarily result in the overturning of an
agency decision as arbitrary and capricious. 256 Given that AI
use can propagate error and harm at scale, and likely
irreversibly, the deference to an agency decision in the face
of imperfections in the chosen data inputs, weights assigned
to features within those inputs, or statistical model seems a
premature end of the analysis. 257 As seen in enacted and
proposed legislation, the inclusion of an assessment of the
degree and impact of those imperfections seems a more
justifiable approach. 258
254. See MIT, Auto-Tuning, supra note 159.
255. Zirkle Fruit Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 442 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1380 (E.D.
Wash 2020).
256. See id. at 1379. Agencies act arbitrarily and capriciously when they rely
upon “a report or study without ascertaining the accuracy of the data contained
in the study or the methodology used to collect the data,” thus rendering their
findings in reliance thereupon “unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id.
(citation and internal punctuation omitted). If challenged, agencies must mount
a “complete analytic defense,” including explanations of the methodology and
assumptions underlying their formulation and selection of statistical models. Id.
at 1380.
257. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 67, at 1147, 1183–84.
258. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 49 § 3(e) (Jan. 11, 2018),
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The need for new or newly applied legal theories is even
greater where these model-related activities occur in the
contexts of unsupervised or self-programming machine
learning. There, the system designers may and likely do not
have complete insight and understanding of the model or
how the system thereby functions to generate its outputs. 259
The growing impetus toward the development of explainable
AI, or so-called “XAI,” is in response to the complexity and
opacity of these unsupervised and self-programming
machine learning scenarios. 260 In all cases, however, the
building, determination, selection, and finding of AI
statistical models are potentially high-impact activities and
ones requiring careful legal understanding and scrutiny. 261
Having highlighted statistical modeling and related AI
processes, the Article turns to the third input in the AI-asprocess model to consider algorithms and their embodiments
of AI-relevant statistical models.

https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437
A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0; Algorithmic Accountability Act of
2019, S. 1108, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019); Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019,
H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019) (enacted). See generally supra note 129
(proposed European Union AI legislation and California Assembly Bill No. 13).
259. See, e.g., Stephen C. Kleene, Representation of Events in Nerve Nets and
Finite Automata, in AUTOMATA STUDIES 3, 4 (Claude E. Shannon & John
McCarthy eds., 1956) (“Having set up such a model, the next step is to seek a
thorough understanding of the model itself.”).
260. Explainable artificial intelligence, or XAI, is a technological aspiration by
which an AI system, in theory, will be able to document or demonstrate in humanunderstandable ways how it functioned; the inputs it used or created or both; the
“reasons” that it functioned in certain ways; and how it derived its results. See
DEF. ADVANCED RSCH. PROJECTS AGENCY, BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT:
EXPLAINABLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (XAI) 5–6, 9 (2016), https://www.darpa
.mil/attachments/DARPA-BAA-16-53.pdf; Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial
Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARVARD J.L.
& TECH. 889, 913–14 (2018); Weston Kowert, Note, The Foreseeability of HumanArtificial Intelligence Interactions, 96 TEX. L. REV. 181 (Nov. 2017). But see INDEP.
HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON A.I., EUR. COMM’N, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR
TRUSTWORTHY AI § 2.2, at 13 (2019), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/d3988569-0434-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1 (stating XAI may not be
achievable or operationalizable).
261. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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C. Algorithms in Artificial Intelligence
Humans have created and used algorithms for millennia,
dating back to those written on Babylonian cuneiform clay
tablets in 1800–1600 B.C.E. 262 The word “algorithm” and the
study of algorithms within a mathematical discipline dates
to the ninth century and the writings of Muḥammad ibn
Mūsā al-Khwārizmī, a Persian scholar and mathematician,
credited for introducing Arabic numbers and algebra into
Europe. 263 In simple homage to those lofty beginnings, this
Section explains what an algorithm is within an AI context
and then goes on to identify and briefly describe some types
of algorithms most commonly used in machine learning AI.
1. What Is an Algorithm?
The concept of an algorithm is not difficult to
understand. Those of us who cook use algorithms often. Aunt
Betty’s strawberry cake recipe is an algorithm with a
famously delicious result. Patterned jury instructions are a
series of algorithms that guide juries through the logic and
nuance 264 embedded in the law to arrive at a computational
result, say, a verdict of guilty or not guilty on a racketeering

262. Christopher McFadden, 15 of the Most Important Algorithms that Helped
Define Mathematics, Computing, and Physics, INTERESTING ENG’G (Aug. 5, 2018),
https://interestingengineering.com/15-of-the-most-important-algorithms-thathelped-define-mathematics-computing-and-physics (discussing Donald E.
Knuth, Ancient Babylonian Algorithms, 15 COMMC’NS ACM 671, 671–72 (1972),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/361454.361514?casa_token=db-UNK0p
y0kAAAAA:AbLZqGnlStmsBFA0rAC6KYogNE1obvL4rfqPbmZa1xAc0vnRVZlY
pyexA9s4oVHj7QsFf02yn-IP ).
263. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 41, at 8; Al-Khwārizmī: Muslim
Mathematician,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/alKhwarizmi (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
264. As to nuance and other topics, the field of computational intelligence
merits mention as a future law-relevant trend related to artificial intelligence.
Computational intelligence examines “how to model, govern, and engage true
human behavior within” machine learning and other artificial intelligence
systems. Leslie Prives, Computationally Intelligent, 13 IEEE WOMEN ENG’G
MAG., Dec. 2019, at 6.
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charge. 265
Stated simply, an algorithm is a series of steps for
accomplishing a task. 266 Detailed instructions and rules
figure into an algorithm’s characteristics. The authors of the
world’s leading textbook on AI explain that an algorithm is a
set of detailed step-by-step instructions by which to
computationally analyze and solve a problem. 267 Defined
another way, an algorithm is a “finite ordered set of welldefined rules for the solution of a problem.” 268
Algorithms may be relatively simple or immensely
complex with a nod of mystical appreciation to the people
who design them. An algorithm may be as straightforward

265. See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. CTS.
8.144, 8.151–.161 (NINTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. 2010),
https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Criminal
_Instructions_6_2021.pdf (associated commentary).

OF THE NINTH CIR.

266. Accord DOMINGOS, supra note 43, at 1; see also Maura R. Grossman &
Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology-Assisted
Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) (defining algorithm as “[a] formally
specified series of computations that, when executed, accomplishes a particular
goal.”).
267. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 41, at 8.
268. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD DICTIONARY
TECHNOLOGY: ANSDIT (2002) (“algorithm” entry at a2.htm). By
“ordered,” the definition means that the items within these rule sets are
organized within a specified arrangement, e.g., hierarchical, such as with a data
tree structure, linear, such as with a sequence. See id. (“order” entry at
o2.htm#order); see also, e.g., Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2007
WL 5734821, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2007) (Markman order construing
algorithm as “sequence of well[-]defined mathematical operations”). But see also,
e.g., N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, CHECKLIST FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A TOOL OR SYSTEM IS AN ADS/AGENCY ADS AS DEFINED BY LOCAL LAW 49
(2018)
1,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-TFChecklist-for-Determining-ADS-Agency.pdf (statutorily-constituted task force
advising city agencies that an algorithm is “[a] set of formal or informal rules,
processes, or instructions for carrying out a specified operation or solving a
problem” (emphasis supplied)). The inclusion of “informal rules, processes, or
instructions” in the task force’s guidance deviates from the formality and welldefined nature of rules as expressed elsewhere and raises cautionary flags as to
the transparency, discipline, accountability, and trustworthiness associated with
agencies’ AI-mediated decision-making.

OF INFORMATION
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as a flowchart 269 or as mind-boggling as those used to
calculate
municipal
bond
markups
and
equity
270
commissions
or priorities-based allocations of affordable
housing. 271
Some algorithms were formulated decades ago and
continue in wide application in non-AI and AI contexts. 272 In
addition, constant innovations emerge around the
optimization of existing algorithms and the creation of new
algorithms directed, for example, at increasingly discrete
functions within AI systems. 273 In addition, there are five
principle schools of thought as to AI algorithm design. 274
Algorithms arising from within the intellectual traditions of
those schools may reflect alternative approaches to specific
AI problems and, in turn, may have implications for legal
analysis.
Further, multiple algorithms are linked in play within a

269. See Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 6 N.Y.3d 636, 639 (2006) (“flow chart, or
algorithm” used by anesthesiologist to permit surgery without cardiac evaluation
beforehand).
270. See Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 208 F.R.D. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
271. See Allen, supra note 64, at 251 n.169.
272. Khanum et al., supra note 40, at 34–35 (K-Means clustering algorithm).
273. See, e.g., Clint P. George, Convolutional Neural Networks: Alternative
Drivers’ Visual Perceptions, 39 IEEE POTENTIALS, Jan./Feb. 2020, at 19, 19–20
(discussing convolutional neural networks (CNNs), a widely-used pattern
recognition algorithm, applied toward creating autonomous vehicle’s machine
vision system as substitute of human visual perception). See also generally
Bojarski, supra note 131 (CNNs in autonomous vehicle project); Khanum et al.,
supra note 40, at 34. CNNs are the most commonly used algorithms for facial
recognition. See Musab Coşkun et al., Face Recognition Based on Convolutional
Neural Network 376 (Nov. 2017), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=
&arnumber=8248937 (2017 International Conference on Modern Electrical and
Energy Systems (MEES), Kremenchuk, Ukraine, Nov. 15–17, 2017). See also
generally Steve Lawrence et al., Face Recognition: A Convolutional NeuralNetwork Approach, 8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL NETWORKS, Jan. 1997, at
98, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/user/bhiksha/WWW/courses/deeplearning/Fall
.2016/pdfs/Lawrence_et_al.pdf.
274. See Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm, C-SPAN2 (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?328407-1/the-master-algorithm; DOMINGOS, supra
note 43, at 51–55.
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given AI application 275 and within the data structures,
systems, and curation processes that form the analytical
framework and provide suitable input data. 276 For example,
a wayfinding AI system disclosed in a series of patents
includes a patent for selecting from among several models
and, in turn and based upon the selected model, from among
several location-determining algorithms, depending upon
the numbers of WI-FI access points detected by the larger
system. 277 The types of algorithms employed depend upon
the problem domain to which the system is directed and the
complexity, velocity, structure, and other characteristics of
the operative data and features. 278 Truly elephantine
mysteries shroud the study of algorithms.
275. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 71, at 264; Tristan Greene, A Beginner’s Guide
to AI: Algorithms, THE NEXT WEB (Aug. 2, 2018, 7:42 PM), https://thenextweb.com
/artificial-intelligence/2018/08/02/a-beginners-guide-to-ai-algorithms/;
Robert
Tibshirani, Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso, 58 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y 267: SERIES B (STAT. METHODOLOGY), 273 (1996) (discussing iterative use of
ridge regression algorithm for computing parameter for lasso algorithm).
276. See JAMES A. STORER, AN INTRODUCTION TO DATA STRUCTURES AND
ALGORITHMS 3 (2002). See also generally, e.g., Stonebraker et al., supra note 202;
MIT, Auto-Tuning, supra note 159.
277. See Location-based Services that Choose Location Algorithms Based on
Number of Detected Access Points Within Range of User Device, U.S. Patent No.
7,305,245, (issued Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter ’245 patent]. This ’245 patent claims
methods of selecting from among several location-determination algorithms that
embody a simple signal strength weighted average or a nearest neighbor model;
a triangulation technique; or an adaptive smoothing technique that accounts for
the velocity of the location-detection device, e.g., mobile phone; or as the
algorithm selection method is further refined, with routing or other inputs from
the user’s wayfinding application. See id. at claims 6–10 (discussing so-called
“Chinese Postman” optimized routing algorithm model as claimed invention’s
preferred embodiment); Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-11571RWZ, 2012 WL 4076180, at *7, *9–10 (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2012) (discussing
“Chinese Postman” model); see also id. at *3 (stipulated construction of “simple
signal strength weighted average” as an “algorithm that includes taking a simple
average of the calculated locations of identified Wi-Fi access points weighted
according to a function of their received signal strengths,” and construction of
“triangulation technique” as an “algorithm that includes (1) estimating the
distances from the user device to at least two identified Wi-Fi access points using
their received signal strengths and (2) determining a location based on the
estimated distances”).
278. See STORER, supra note 276, at 161.
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2. Common Classes of Artificial Intelligence Algorithms
Remember, statistical models only approximate
relationships between features within the input data to
produce AI outputs. These models are expressed or embodied
within corresponding algorithms. Thousands of types of
algorithms are used in and are being newly directed toward
AI tasks. 279 This Section discusses three common classes of
AI algorithms used in machine learning, 280 classification,
regression, and clustering algorithms. 281 It also provide
examples of the application of each class. To introduce the
terminology, it also names some subtypes within each class
of algorithm. 282
a. Classification Algorithms
Classification algorithms are used in supervised
machine learning scenarios. 283 Under those models, a
classification algorithm-equipped AI system is “taught” how
to sort input variables into outcome classes. The output
target of classification algorithms AI is qualitative, such as a
class or a label, or tag, associated with a particular class.

279. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 273.
280. Output generation is not the sole role of algorithms in AI. For example,
algorithms may be applied to data curation tasks prior to the output-focused
computation. See, e.g., MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note 21, at 138 (k-means cluster
algorithm used to provide initial estimates for subsequent iterative computation
using expectation maximization algorithm); HASTIE, ET AL., supra note 94, at 43
(input transformations by linear regression methods, considerably expanding
their scope); Stonebraker, et al., supra note 202, at 1 (machine learning for data
curation tasks).
281. Some algorithms may fall within more than one of these classes,
depending upon the desired AI output, see, for example, MOHAMMED ET AL., supra
note 21, at 83–84 (k-nearest neighbors algorithm used in classification and
regression model-driven systems), and there are many more types of algorithms
than discussed herein, see, for example, Tibshirani, supra note 275, at 274–86.
282. Each algorithmic type may be iteratively broken down into hierarchies.
For example, a random forest classifier algorithm is a type of bootstrap
aggregator algorithm, which is a type of decision tree algorithm, which, in turn,
is a type of classification algorithm.
283. See AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149.
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Classification is a process in which a model, also called a
“function,” is found that will distinguish between data
classes, also called “concepts.” 284 The purpose, therefore, of
classification algorithms is to sort data into binary 285 or
multiple classes of output. 286 To illustrate, consider a child
welfare ADSS directed toward distinguishing a data class, or
concept, e.g., “high child risk,” from other classes. 287 The
system uses data about the child and his or her family,
medical, and educational circumstances. An AI system could
use a classification algorithm to sort those collections of data
and circumstances into two categories: one in which the
subject child is predicted to be exposed to an unacceptable
level of risk of injury or other maltreatment and should be
considered for removal from the home and placement into
foster care; and one in which he or she is not predicted to
have that level of risk exposure and should not be considered
for removal.
Numerical scores produced through the algorithm’s
computation are compared, perhaps against a threshold
value for the class associated with unacceptably high risk or
to the class associated with acceptable risk. 288 To be
considered together with this concept of thresholds as
driving class assignment are the types of errors that can
occur in those classifications: false positives, or Type I, errors
in which low risk data concepts are improperly assigned to
the high risk class; and false negatives, or Type II, errors in
which high risk data concepts are improperly assigned to the
284. HAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 1.4.3, at 18.
285. See Amir E. Khandani et al., Consumer Credit-risk Models via Machinelearning Algorithms, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2767, 2781 (2010).
286. See Brown, supra note 71, at 237–38 (multiple classes); HAN ET AL., supra
note 43, § 1.4.3, at 18.
287. See generally, e.g., Kyle Jennison, Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Human Svc’s
Off. Analytics, Tech. & Planning, Guest Lecture in Artificial Intelligence & Social
Justice Class (Apr. 12, 2021) (video on file with author) (discussing Family
Screening tool); Glaberson, supra note 64 (discussing Eckerd Rapid Safety
Feedback tool).
288. See Khandani et al., supra note 285, at 2781.
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low risk class. 289 Central to the legal implications that follow,
a threshold for the acceptable rate of each type of error is
established with the aim of balancing the system’s
performance as to these errors. 290 The precision of that
balance is intentional around these two types of errors and
must be especially so when, for example, the individual and
societal risks involved in improperly attributing a crime to
an innocent person, that is, a Type II error. To evaluate the
reliability of evidence, for example, from classification AI
systems, lawyers need to be able understand and examine
the systems’ rates of both types of errors.
Some subtypes of classification algorithms that are
frequently used in AI 291 include naïve Bayes, 292 hierarchical
algorithms known as decision trees, or DTs, 293 random
forest, 294 support vector machines, or SVMs, 295 and k-nearest
neighbours algorithms. 296

289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149.
292. See DOMINGOS, supra note 43, at 151–53; MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note
21, at 73–82; see also Tony Yiu, Understanding Bayes’ Theorem: Understanding
the Rationale Behind the Famous Theorem, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Oct. 19, 2019),
https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-bayes-theorem-7e31b8434d4b.
293. See STORER, supra note 275, at 127; MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note 21, at
37–48; Nagesh Singh, Decision Tree Algorithm, Explained: All You Need to Know
about Decision Trees and How to Build and Optimize Decision Tree Classifier
(Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.kdnuggets.com/2020/01/decision-tree-algorithmexplained.htmlsee also, e.g., STORER, supra note 275, at 132–50, 267 (discussing
binary search trees); id. at 237–47 (2–3 trees); id. at 248–51 (red-black trees); id.
at 254–57, 267 (Adelson-Velskii and Landis, or AVL, trees).
294. See DOMINGOS, supra note 43, at 238; Tony Yiu, Understanding Random
Forest: How the Algorithm Works and Why It Is So Effective, TOWARDS DATA SCI.
(June 12, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-random-forest58381e0602d2.
295. See DOMINGOS, supra note 43, at 190–96; MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note
21, at 115–28.
296. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, § 2.3, at 30. But cf. Brown, supra note
71, at 280 (characterizing K-nearest neighbor algorithm as of clustering, rather
than classification, type).
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b. Regression Algorithms
Regression analysis, and the algorithms that carry out
these computations, is a tool by which the relationship
between two or more variables, meaning input data, may be
isolated and identified while “controlling for,” that is, holding
constant, the effects of other variables that impact on the
subject variables. 297 The purpose of employing regression
analysis is to hypothesize and test the proposed hypothesis
that there is a strong, that is, statistically significant,
relationship between the subject variables that may not be
attributable to relationships with other variables. 298 The
mere existence of a statistically significant relationship
between subject variables does not illuminate the underlying
reason for that relationship, however. 299 Importantly, the
existence of such a relationship does not establish that the
presence or value of one variable causes the presence or
value of the other. 300
For example, a regression analysis in a housing lending
application may show a statistically significant correlation
between mortgage applicants’ zip code and late mortgage
payments or defaults. Such a correlation may be the basis for
the decision, autonomously made by an algorithmic system
or an AI-mediated decision made by humans, to deny
mortgage lending to applicants living within particular zip
code areas or to grant that lending but at substantially
higher rates. The correlation determined by regression
analysis does not signify a causal relationship between zip
code and mortgage risk, however. 301 Rather, the data as to
297. CHARLES WHEELAN, NAKED STATISTICS: STRIPPING
DATA 11 (2013).

THE

DREAD

FROM THE

298. Accord id. at 12.
299. Accord id.
300. Accord id.
301. E.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 360 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (“Regression statistics by
themselves only demonstrate correlations between variables; to move from
correlation to causation, there must be some independent theory about the causal
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which the correlation is derived may be profoundly tainted
by historical racial discrimination by government and other
actors and nevertheless wrongly used to continue the deeply
discriminatory “redlining” 302 and its enduring and
propagating legacy. 303
Regression algorithms are also commonly used in
supervised machine learning models. 304 Here, however, the
aim is to predict a numeric computational result, 305 rather
than a qualitative classification result.
The point of regression models is to fit a curve to a set of
input data points, including a curve, for example, in the form
of a straight line for linear regression. 306 That curve is fitted,
including overfitted or underfitted, based upon relationship
criteria in the regression model.
There are many regression models. Among the
regression algorithms often used in AI 307 are linear
regression, least absolute shrinkage and selection operator,
also referred to as “lasso,” regression, 308 logistic regression,
and multiple or multivariate, regression algorithms. 309 From
a viewpoint 30,000 feet above the elephant, the differences
between these types of regression analyses and the
algorithms that express them include: (1) the geometry of the
curve that explains the function, that is, the mathematical
expression, of the relationship predicted to exist between the
relationships of the variables.”).
302. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 64, at 235–53.
303. See PASQUALE, supra note 111, at 23; Havard, supra note 241, at 247.
304. See AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149.
305. See HAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 13.2.1, at 599.
306. As to linear regression, see id. § 1.4.3, at 19; id. § 13.2.2, at 90; id. § 3.4.5,
at 105–06; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, at 43; NEILL A. WEISS, INTRODUCTORY
STATISTICS 745 (1997) (Def. No. 13.2, “regression line”).
307. See AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149.
308. Tibshirani, supra note 275, at 267.
309. See, e.g., WHEELAN, supra note 297, at 198–204; HASTIE ET AL., supra note
94, at 106 (discussing multiple linear regression as yielding single output
modeled as linear function of two or more inputs); WEISS, supra note 306, at 778.

2021]

AI, ON THE LAW OF THE ELEPHANT

1467

independent and dependent variables within the subject
dataset; 310 and (2) the numbers of variables that the analysis
is attempting to correlate.
c. Clustering Algorithms
Cluster analysis, also known as “data segmentation,” 311
is a statistical method of analysis that employs algorithms
and other tools 312 by which to organize similar objects or data
items into groups, or “clusters.” 313 Clustering algorithms are
designed to maximize the similarities between objects
belonging to the same group and minimize the similarities
between those objects and objects in other groups. 314 The
similarity indicators are referred to as “proximate
measures.” 315 Clustering may be especially useful when
analyzing a large data set by grouping together into smaller
meaningful groups similar, those being more relationally
proximate items, as distinguished from less similar or
dissimilar, those being less proximate items. 316
Humans have long used clustering as an analytical
method in science and in everyday life. 317 To illustrate, the
children in my family practiced clustering analysis when we
played “buttons,” a game that involved emptying our abuela’s
button jar and then sorting and grouping the buttons by

310. See, e.g., Tibshirani, supra note 275, at 270–72, Fig’s 1–4.
311. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, at 501.
312. Jorgé Bacallao Gallestey, Cluster Analysis, BRITANNICA., https://www
.britannica.com/topic/cluster-analysis (last visited Dec. 8, 2021).
313. Shimon Ullman et al., Ctr. for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT,
Unsupervised Learning: Clustering 2 (2014), http://www.mit.edu/~9.54/fall14
/slides/Class13.pdf.
314. See Gallestey, supra note 312; HASTIE,
(cluster analysis).

ET AL.,

supra note 94, at 501–03

315. Ullman et al., supra note 313, at 6.
316. See id. at 3; Gallestey, supra note 312.
317. See, e.g., JOHN SNOW, ON THE MODE OF COMMUNICATION OF CHOLERA 12–
26 (1849), https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/ext/cholera/PDF/0050707.pdf (famous
historical clustering analyses linking cholera cases to contaminated wells).
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color, size, and other characteristics. Certain characteristics
of the input data may be weighted differently, rather than all
uniformly, to produce clusters that may be more suitable for
various reasons. 318 In the buttons game, fabric-covered
buttons may have been considered more desirable than bone,
metal, or plastic buttons and, therefore, weighted more
heavily in terms of their desirability in the game.
Unsupervised machine learning uses cluster analysis
and various types of clustering algorithms. 319 Fraud
detection systems designed to protect consumers’ debit and
credit cards are an example of a clustering algorithm-based
AI systems. A subject consumer’s payment card transactions
may be grouped together based upon the general
geographical location in which her transactions are usually
made, for example, in the Washington, D.C. area. A
clustering algorithm-based AI system may flag transactions
coming from, say, Barbados, as potentially fraudulent and
the transaction may be declined, pending confirmation by the
consumer.
Among clustering algorithms commonly in AI use 320 are
k-means clustering, 321 fuzzy C-means, 322 expectation
maximization, or EM, 323 hierarchical clustering, 324 and
hidden Markov model algorithms. 325

318. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 94, at 504.
319. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 113
(2014); Khanum et al., supra note 40; AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149.
320. See AI Algorithms Guide, supra note 149; MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note
21, at 17, 145–48 (hidden Markov model).
321. See MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note 21, at 31–36.
322. See HAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 11.1.1, at 499–501.
323. See MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note 21, at 138.
324. See HAN ET AL., supra note 43, § 10.1.3, at 449; id. § 10.3, at 457–59.
325. See MOHAMMED ET AL., supra note 21, at 145–48.
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V. CONCLUDING FORWARD
This Article has lent its efforts to providing readers with
a single concise, accessible, but comprehensive source for
better understanding the complex, fascinating, and
potentially terrifying elephant of artificial intelligence. A
majestic mystery, AI has entered crashing into legal domains
and, if not insightfully governed, threatens people, civil
society, and humanity in an unbridled, market-driven
frenzy.
By pondering these contributions and continuing their
respective journeys to learn more, lawyers throughout the
profession will be more ethically competent, intellectually
rigorous, and authoritative in their profoundly critical and
urgent work regarding artificial intelligence. These gains
will work to improve the governance, security, justness, and
well-being of the increasingly algorithmic world.

